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Zero base budgeting is neither a new concept nor
one founded in the traditions of private and public
budget systems. It is r instead, the latest in a long
series of budget reform movements bent upon
rationalizing an otherwise incremental process. No
longer a theoretical construct in search of an
application, successful instances of zero base
budgeting are more frequently being encountered in
state government as well as private enterprise.
Implementation in the federal sector, however, poses
new difficulties which must be recognized lest zero
base budgeting follow the course of previous reforms.
By examining the budget reform movement as well as
current zero base applications, this thesis attempts
to identify those difficulties, offer po-ssible
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A. SIATESENI OF THE PB03LEM
This thesis concerns itself with zero base budgeting and
its implementation in the federal sector, particularly in
the Department of Defense. As sucn it contemplates rational
economic choice, necessitated by scarcity, in a hostile
environment characterized by complexity, time constraints
and politics. The text which follows will seek to
demonstrate that the success of zero base budgeting in
private industry and state government does net automatically
assure its success in the federal Dureaucracy where nuirercus
peculiar pitfalls lie in wait. Expectations of federal
success can ne substantially enhanced, however, by ex a lining
the underlying causes of failure in past attempts to
rationalize the budget process. Knowledge of such causes
coupled with the diverse experience to be gained from
observing private and state applications can do much to
improve the chance of survival in the federal arena.
E. SCOPE
The orientation of this thesis to tne lessons of past
reform and current applications provides the background for
its central cbjective: developing a general approach to
zero base budgeting in the federal sector. To this end
Chapters II and III examine the history of cudget reform

from several perspectives with primary emphasis en the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) reform as a precursor
of today's Zero 3ase Eudgeting (ZBS) movement. The primary
purpose cf such an examination is to isolate those factors
which either impair or facilitate a rational approach.
Having adequately searched the past in Chapters II and III,
Chapter IV goes on to define zero oase budgeting as it is
commonly conceptualized today in terms cf a systematic
decision making process. The purpose of such a definition
is to provide a model against which the many current and
diverse applications can be compared. Such comparison is
accomplished in Chapter V by first looking at applications
in private enterprise, next reviewing the aiethodolcgy in
state government and finally drawing conclusions about the
mest useful aspects cf each. Chapter V seeks to establish a
foundation upon which the experience gained from past
reforms and current applications can be trought to bear.
Current federal and Defense plans are then explored and
evaluated in Chapter' VI with respect tc this empirical
construct. finally, in Chapter VI, a proposed approach to
zero base budgeting in the Department of Defense for the
1980s is offered.
C. dETBCEOLCGY
In preparing this thesis the author relied heavily on
three sources of information. First, to adequately explore
the facets cf past refcrm efforts, considerable information
and numerous ideas were drawn from existing literature
(books, periodicals, congressiona 1 documents, etc.) . For the
comparison of private and state government applications of
zero base budgeting, the author drew censiderably from
tudget manuals provided by corporation and state tudget
offices. Lastly, data relevant to current plans for
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implementing zero base budgeting in the federal sector, and
particularly the Department of Defense, was obtained by
interviewing cognizant Defense personnel in the Washington,
C.C., area during the period 19 to 23 June 1977.
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II. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF BUDGET REFORM
Comprehensive budgeting, more commonly referred to as
zero base budget in g[ 1 ], is but the latest development in a
long history of budget reform. To understand the former,
one must first understand the latter. In this respect zero
base budgeting has not
"...come to us as Aphrodite from the sea,
full blown, fresh, ceautiful and topless. "[ 2
^
Instead budget reform has been an evolutionary process each
phase of which has been profoundly affected by what went
before it and by the particular environment in which it has
occurred. Ihe purpose of this chapter is to examine the
history of budget reform and, by so doing, discover those
lessons which if applied to zero base budgeting will further
its chances of survival.
A. EARLY FOUNDATIONS CF BUDGETING
If defined as the allocation of scarce resources between
alternatives, budgeting obviously had very early beginnings,
for what does man do ether than to make choices? Who is to
say when budgeting was first recognized as such? Perhaps
the first signs of fiscal consciousness emerged in biblical
times in the Nile, Tigres and Eurphrates river valleys.
Ihere, taxes were levied by the ruling pharcahs, collected
in the form of grains and other sucstances and subseguentiy
disbursed in kind for services received.^] Involving the
12

transfer cf wealth from citizen to ruler and back again,
such process conceptually differs only in degree of
complexity from the experience of modern government.
Although conceptually similar, significant technical
differences exist. The concept cf "public" did not exist as
clearly delineated today. The ruler's power, whether
despotic or benevolent, and consequent control over the
state, were dependent upon the size of his central coffers.
As a consequence, and in the absence cf an accounting
technology or the desire for one, "public" and private
resources were intermixed. Increasing one's wealth was a
game played equally well by the king's cwn tax collectors
and disbursing clerks as well as his enemies. Tax
collections en route to the central treasury as well as
disbursements to the local citizenry were pilfered by those
also seeking wealth and power. Lacking an accounting
mechanism whereby an agent's private resources could be
differentiated from public collections, the ruler resorted
to ether techniques for imposing personal accountability.
from tne earliest pharoahs through the Roman Empire to
Medieval tines, punitive measures including execution,
imprisonment, banishment or more hideous sanctions were
imposed upon those who deprived "Caesar" of that which was
"his." As an alternative, particularly where an agent
structure was not feasible, states resorted to selling
public offices and with it the right to collect and disburse
"public" funds. In such a way the state was assured revenue
in the form of fixed contract payments. The incentive for
those who would purchase and hold public office as private
property was the potential profit to te gained from
exploiting their investment to the maximum extent. The loss
cf significant revenues by the state to such investors as
well as the outcry of the exploited citizenry led to the
demise cf this practice and to the growth cf a bureaucracy
cf accountable collectors and spenders.
13

From these earliest moments of fiscal consciousness are
found the roots of the budget reform icvement. 2arly
attempts to gain greater control of the state's wealth,
instigated by and for the king, were gradually replaced by
greater controls over the king himself. Public awareness,
first that of the vested few and subsequently of the general
public, cf the losses attendant in privately owned public
offices, corrupt officials, mismanagement and inadequate
administrative practices provided the impetus for
development cf the formal budget.
The evolutionary process culminating in a formalized
budget paralleled the growth cf representative government.
Ihe first movement in this direction occurred in Britain in
1217 with the signing of the 3agna Charta. Its 12th article
stated that
"No scutage cr aid shall-be imposed in the
kingdom unless by the common council of the
reasonable in amount."
Vihile emphasizing control over revenue collection, such
decree had the implicit effect of also controlling the
king's expenditures. Since taxes were approved for specific
purposes, it was expected that revenues collected were to be
used solely for that purpose. Referred to as "earmarking",
even to tnis day, such a procedure became impractical as the
number of special taxes and objects of expenditure grew
geometrically to meet society's needs.
Not until late in the seventeenth century did
Parliament begin to establish explicit control over the
crown's expenditures. In 1bS9 the Eill of Sights
established the role of Parliament in authorizing all
expenditures by the King. Clearly a precursor cf the
American tradition to follow, such autnorizations were tc oe
initiated in the mere representative body, the House of
14

Commons. Hesitant to restrict the Crown's power too
severely, the details of expenditure control, particularly
with respect to purpose, was a gradual process applied first
to the King's military
.
[ 4 ] Also in 1689 the Civil List
differentiated the King's personal outlays, which were to be
limited, from the state's expenditures. The break between
public and private was made even more explicit some time
after 1760 when the traditional Crown revenues were replaced
by an annual stipend from Parliament. While refinements to
the Crown's prerogatives continued in successive
Parliaments, the foundations of budgeting had firmly teen
established in Parliamentary control.
Having both revenue and expenditure under control of
Parliament provided a basis for passage of the Comprehensive
fund Act. in 1787 whereby all revenue and expenditures were
to be recorded to a single fund. More importantly the
general fund provided a focal point for recording revenues
and disbursements arising from a variety of tax bills and
objects of expenditure. Much of the work during this
period was accomplished by William Pitt the Younger,
Chancellor of the Excheguer, whose reforms net only included
the General Fund, but technigues of double entry accounting
and control over the state debt. Through his efforts the
first comprehensive accounting of governmental activity was
brought about, thereby providing the means for establishing
accountability to the public. It was net until 1822,
however, that the Chancellor of the Excheguer provided to
Parliament a formal statement of revenues, expenditures,
expected surplus or deficit and financial plan for review
and guidance. Such was the beginning of a budget discipline
as it is widely recognized today.
Although not yet fully developed as a budget system by
the time of the 1776 American Revolution, much of what
happened in Britain was applied to the American scene.
Unhappy memories of efforts dating back to the Magna Charta
to control the powers of the British Crown were perhaps
15

responsible for excluding mention of the executive in the
Articles cf Confederation (1781) and for later delegation of
fiscal responsibility to Congress in the Constitution
(1789). In this regard, the Constitution specifies that
and that
"All bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives"
(Article 2, Section 7)
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury
but in consequence of appropriations made by
law; and a regular statement and account ci
the receipts and expenditures of all public
money shall he published from time to time."
(Article I, Section 9)
Notwithstanding such explicit delineations of
responsibility, the first decade from 1789 to 1799 saw
several actions which might have resulted in the executive
predominance which the Founding Fathers had so actively
sought to avoid. The first was passage cf the Treasury Act
(1 Stat. L. 65) which not only enacted the requirement for
financial reporting quoted above but established a Treasury
Department within the Executive Branch with the tasking to
"...digest and prepare plans for the
improvement of the revenue . . . (and) to
prepare and report estimates of the public
revenue and expenditures."
The second event was President Washington's appointment of
Alexander Hamilton to the position of first Secretary cf the
Treasury. Hamilton's strong leadership in the financial
affairs of the fledgling nation reflected a wide
interpretation of the Treasury Act. Not only did he prepare
the required estimates of needed revenues and prcpcsed
expenditures, but his actions foretold of an assumed role in
deciding upon those programs which were deserving of support
and those which were not. Furthermore, Hamilton's first
16

budget provided little detail, including cnly four major
line items, that is, funds for a Civil List, for the Army
and Navy, tor outstanding Treasury warrants, and fcr all
ether federal activities. [ 5 ] Such a broad interpretation of
duties and apparent short treatment cf Congressional
prerogatives significantly broadened presidential discretion
and would have led to the development cf a coordinated
executive budget had it not been fcr Congressional
disenchantment.
Initially Congress exercised its monetary powers in the
Haouse of Representatives through discussion in a ccmaittee
consisting cf all members. Only after this deliberation was
a committee of select individuals appointed to translate
such discussions into an appropriations bill. Such early
deliberative bodies lacked the means to do ether than ratify
executive branch, i.e., Hamilton's, proposals. Prompted by
growing disenchantment with the situation and by Jefferson's
advice that
"...it would be prudent to multiply barriers
against their (the funds) dissipation by
appropriating specific sums to every specific
program susceptible of definition...",
Congress in 1792 acted tc curtail executive practices by
specifying in detail line items of expenditure indicating
for what purpose funds might be used. lacking periodic
reports cf public expenditures, executive discretion was
nevertheless continued by transferring funds between line
items. Without the means to monitor specific line items, it
is not suprising that Congress rarely knew how funds were
actually used. Having all but lest control, the House acted
quickly to reverse the trend by temporarily establishing in
the House of Representatives a Committee on Ways and Means
charged with the handling of both revenues and expenditures.
The Ways and Means Committee proved mere than adequate
in balancing the growth of executive discretion and, with
17

the increasing number of specific line item controls,
executive-legislative friction increased sharply. Gradually
the executive departments were forced to deal directly with
a growing Congressional committee structure. The Secretary
cf the Treasury's Book of Estimates, initially evolving
toward a comprehensive budget recommendation, instead became
merely a reflection cf individual departmental requests. By
1802 the continuing friction between legislative and
executive branches resulted in permanent establishment of
the House Ways and Means Committee and increasingly detailed
appropriations to further curb executive discretion.
Beginning in 1802
"...budget making became an exclusively
legislative function in national government
and as such it continued for mere than a
century. "[ 6 ]
Although continuing to dominate the budget scene until
approximately 19 10, the legislative branch experienced
several significant changes. Having relegated the Treasury
to a clerical role, Ways and Means continued to provide the
only forum for comprehensive consideration cf both revenues
and expenditures simultaneously. Executive influence
remained at a low, but continued to be expressed, however
slightly, through the initial departmental requests and
through leadership of an emerging political party structure.
Net until 1865 did this comprehensiveness prove to be too
much for the single Ways and Means Committee. Increasing
financial activity paralleling the nation's growth and
specifically the start of the Civil War necessitated
separation of revenue and expenditure considerations.
Starting in 1865 with creation of the House Committee on
Appropriations and in 1867 a similar forum in the Senate,
the number of committees authorized to recemmend
appropriations grew to ten and eight in the House and Senate
respectively by 1885. Introduction of so many appropriating
18

committees fragmented the finance mechanism into a piecemeal
process, replacing the comprehensiveness cf the years
before. The lack of a single point of coordination for
revenue and expenditure decisions was to beccme one of the
many focal points of the budget reform effcrt for years to
ccme.
Actually the rise in the number cf appropriations
committees, particularly after the Civil War, can tc some
extent be attributed to a significant rise in revenues from
a growing industrial and population base. Revenues
substantially in excess of government expenditures created
large surpluses available for disposal by ambitious and
energetic Congressmen. Anxious to cultivate brcader
constituent bases, proposals for new standing committees and
program legislation abounded. That such surpluses shculd
also breed wasteful practices, irresponsibility and
corruption within both branches of government is not
suprising. In speaking of Congress James Eryce, historian
and author of The Ameri can Commonwealth , advised in 1888
that
"Under the system cf congressional finance
here described, America wastes millions
annually. Eut her wealth is so great, her
revenue so elastic, that she is net sensible
of the loss. She has the glorious privelige
of youth, the privilege of committing errors
witnout suffering from their
censeguences ."[7
]
In speaking of the executive branch, Jesse Burkhead, an
eminent observer of government budgeting, further indicates
that
"Congressional extravagances during this
period were matched only by the profligacy cf
the executive departments. "[ 8
]
These early beginnings of budgeting as a discipline and
cf the Airerican federal budget process provided the setting
19

upon which subsequent reform was to thrive. Congressional
efforts tc correct the deficiencies of the late 19th Century
are but one segment of a pervasive process mere
appropriately described as part of the 20th Century reform
ucvement. Eefore continuing with a description of that
effort it may be beneficial to briefly summarize a few of
the significant developments with which later reform efforts
must deal.
-First, from the time of earliest fiscal
consciousness to the dawning American
experience and even to this date, a central
theme of budgeting has been ccntrol. Its
gradual evolution from executive ccntrol over
tax collectors to legislative ccntrol over
the executive has not occurred by chance but
by design of the Founding Fathers. That such
controlling tendencies are not likely to be
changed easily is an important factor with
which future reforms aiusl contend.
-Secondly, the degree of workload imposed by
a budget system had dramatic impact eparticularly on the compr ehensiveness^ or
nudget review. The rising workload faced by
Ways and Means in the late 19th Century v»as
at least in part respcnsinle for
fragmentation of an otherwise comprehensive
mechanism. Future attempts to introduce a
greater degree of comprehensiveness in the
nudget process must anticipate the impact of
added workload if the process is not tc
become even more fragmented.
20

-Thirdly, fiscal setting has profound
influence on the development cf budget
mechanisms. The significant surpluses of the
period 1880-1909 did not prove conducive tc
stricter executive and legislative control.
In fact the opposite occurred, with excessive
wealth providing a political playground.
Perhaps as surpluses are replaced by
deficits, reform efforts will tnrive anc
rational decision making will he found tc
play a greater role, and to a certain extent
at least to replace politics.
-Lastly, what had been attained by 1910 had
not happened overnight but through a gradual
prccess of modification and change. That a
oudget process is rarely diverted from its
historical past and evolutionary path, except
in crisis, is a fact often lest on well
intentioned budget reformers.
Having lcoked at much of the history of budgeting and its
underlying characteristics, it is more meaningful new to
leck at budget reforms of the 20th Century.
E. PEESEECTIVES ON EUCGET EEPOBM
k mest interesting and yet most disturbing aspect of
budget reform is the number of diverse perspectives from
yhich it is viewed. Take for example the budget refcrm
movement's most recent offspring, zero-base budgeting.
Ccming of age in 1977, zero-base budgeting brought with it a
plethora cf literature describing what some advocates termed
a radical departure frcm existing budget methcdology. Erom
an opposite vantage, public officials with whom the author
has spoken point to aspects of the existing budget
methodology which, they contend, are already zero-cased and
conseguently see only slight change in business as usual.
Viewed ay itself neither perspective is sufficiently helpful
in understanding zero-base budgeting, its conceptual
foundation and subsequent growtn. Instead, this author
21

contends that zero-base budgeting must be viewed from both
perspectives, not just as a departure (one perhaps rot so
radical as is commonly thought) from the current
methodology, but also as the latest increment in an evolving
reform movement begun as early as 1906.
Viewed within the historical context briefly outlined in
the previous section (and reemphasized here) , budget reform
has many dimensions, each of which must be examined if one
is to benefit from past difficulties. A first dimension
might be the changing external environment. Charles Beard
(an American historian of the early Twentieth Century) wrote
that
"Budget reform bears the imprint cf the age
in which it originated ."[ 9
]
As will be seen in subsequent paragraphs, events of the last
seventy years attest to the truth of Eeard's prophetic
statement. Another dimension is that of the uses to which
the budget is put. Although first emerging as a device for
limiting the powers of government, budgeting in the next
seventy years was to pass through three fairly distinct
stages - frcir control to management to planning
.[ 1 ] In
what fellows each stage is addressed in the context cf its
principle product - line item budgeting, performance
Budgeting, and Planning, Programming and Eudgeting (PPE) .
The third stage, Planning, can by itself be an important
perspective from which to view the last seventy years of
budget reform. It too will be examined by shewing that the
initial purposes underlying line item budgeting and
Performance budgeting and PPB were planning oriented. While
the initial intent in each case was not fully achieved, the
result of each effort was to push the budget progressively
further in the planning direction. Each of these dimensions




"...a struggle to develop program data and tc
link it with resource data."[1l]
Zero-Base Budgeting is the product of this struggle and as
will be seen can provide the linkage that has been sought
fcr so long.
C. THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET
Although an evolutionary process in itself, budgetary
development described in the first section of this paper is
test viewed as the setting for a succession of reform
efforts extending from 1906 to the present. Viewed frcm the
perspectives and in the dimensions described above, the
budget reform movement of the last seventy years represents
a significant departure from pre-1906 practices. As the
reader may recall, budgeting pricr to 1906 was characterized
as fragmented in the sense that neither a coordinated
executive budget ncr coordinated Congressional review was in
existence. Instead Congress was given the budget directly
by each of the federal agencies. After uncoordinated
reviews by each of numerous committees, funds were allocated
directly to the agencies by specific appropriations.
Presidential recommendations either on the request itself or
subseguent allocations resulting therefrom were incidental
and unsystematic. Not by accident but rather by design, the
fragmented budget was a device for limiting the powers of
government and particularly its chief executive. The
corruption and waste of the late 19th Century, the
revelations of the "Muckrakers" and the impact of a growing
national deficit following the Spanish American War all
however, were to stimulate a reorientation of the tudget
process. In contrast to the cumbersome and largely
ineffective traditions of control, budgeting subseguent to
23

1906 was to assume a more positive role. faced by the hard
economic and political facts of deficit spending but hand in
hand with the activism of President Taft and the
progressivism of the time, reformers saw no alternative to
executive leadership through a more centralized and
controlled budget. Typical of the early reformist view was
that cf Frederick. Cleveland (member of the New York Eureau
of Municipal Research) who argued that only cne individual,
the President,
"...could think in terms of the institution
as a whole" and therefore "...is the only one
who can be made responsible for
leadership . "[ 12
]
He was later to add that
"The atmosphere of democracy must he filtered
and made to flow into useful channels by the
power cf leadership which can be made
accountable. "[ 1 3 ]
Such was the birth of an executive budget characterized not
just in terms of acccuntability as based in tradition but,
mere importantly, as a primary tool to be used by executive
leadership in the planned and managed attainment of
society's objectives. As will be seen, the desires of early
reformers were net so easily implemented. Instead the
leadership tasking provided the seeds for gradual pursuit of
an executive budget evolving first as a refinement of cbject
of expenditure control (1906-1935), secondly in terms of
performance (1936-1960) , thirdly as a planning tool
(1961-1977) and finally as a consolidation cf all three in
zero-base budgeting (1977-?) . Each is discussed more
thoroughly in what follows.
1 • line-item Eudq etinq
Although budget reformers unanimously agreed upon
the need fcr an executive budget, considerable divergence
24

continued to exist in the motives underlying such drives
toward centralization. Far from expressing with one voice a
shared concept of the budget as a mechanism of planning,
management and control, unanimity existed cnly to the extent
that different groups saw executive budgeting as the common
solution to their separate objectives, that is, achieving
control or management or planning. On the one hand was the
progressive reformer who saw executive budgeting as a means
for attaining social improvements and who, therefore,
advocated a predominant planning orientation. On the ether
hand was the businessman who, worried by the increasing tax
burden, graft and corruption, saw executive budgeting as a
means of reducing expenditures and ensuring a continued role
for that entrepeneur who, like himself, might, otherwise be
preempted by the "enterprising" politician. To him,
executive budgeting as a mechanism cf ccntrol was most
important. Ihe importance of this divergence in motives was
net fully recognized until one tried to move from the theory
of executive budgeting to reality.
The first movements in such a direction occurred at
the local level of public finance with the pioneering work
cf the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. In its
efforts to establish a budget system for New York City, the
Bureau was forced to reconcile these divergent interests in
planning and control. Somewhat biased by its progressive
leadership, the Bureau initially pursued a program approach,
concerning itself with the planning and execution of
governmental functions. The functional approach hewever
failed to satisfy that prerequisite of budget usage dating
tack to the times of earliest fiscal consciousness, i.e.,
that the budget first of all must provide a means of
controlling the administration. The graft, corruption and
"muckraking" of the times reaffirmed and perhaps deepened
the conviction that control lias at the very heart of
budgeting. As most succinctly stated by Allen Shick (Eudget
Specialist for the Congressional Research Service)
25

"In an age where personnel and purchasing
controls were unreliable, the first
consideration was how to prevent
administrative improprieties . "[ 14]
Faced with overwhelming evidence of the above, the Eurean
was forced to subordinate functional budgeting and its focus
on rational planning tc the control function. As the Eureau
cf Municipal Research was to state, functional budgeting
"...must be left in abeyance until central
control has been effectively established anc
the basis has been laid for careful scrutiny
of departmental contracts and purchases as
well as departmental work." [15]
Alternative means for providing such scrutiny including
civil service reform and salary classifications, centralized
purchasing through competitive bidding, financial audits and
uniform accounting techniques, were tc appear and to
parallel development of the executive budget. Ir the
absence cf these techniques at that time, stringent control
ever executive expenditures was considered a necessity. The
precedent for such ccntrol, as had been developed throughout
the earlier years of American History, was tc appropriate by
object or expenditure (also referred to as line items), that
is, to put strict controls on the input side of the resource
equation. so it was to be with New York city in its first
departmental budget, that of the Health Department in 1S07.
Having been institutionalized, line itemization gained rapid
acceptance and use.
Prior to continuing, examination cf the advantages and
disadvantages associated with objects of expenditure as a
control technique is most desirable at this point. First of
all, the object of expenditure classification serves very
well to limit executive discretion. Where the executive
budget specifies in detail the "things" tc be bought and
where such detail specification is perpetuated in
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legislative appropriations, execution becc&es perfunctory,
leaving little management prerogative. It is in essence a
means of transferring decision making pcwer frcm lcwer
levels tc higher levels of the governing apparatus. Such
centralization need not occur in the legislative tranch
(although it often does) but may be vested in a central
tudget office merely by specifying detail objects and
accordant allocation of funds at that level. Secondly, as
opposed to a functicnal-program orientation, governments
tend to buy the same things albeit for different purposes.
For example, all governments buy personnel services, fuel,
airline travel, office supplies, utilities, computers, etc.
Net all governments, however, finance a Public Safety
Education Program. Therefore, objects cf expenditure
provide a common basis upon which uniform accounting
structures can be developed for application throughout
government. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly ,- objects
cf expenditure are more easily understood by these who
review the budget documents. For example, it is much easier
tc isolate the underlying reasons for and to grasp the
meaning cf a thirty percent increase in fuel costs then to
understand the reason cr meaning of a ten percent increase
in the President's Energy Conservation Program.
Attendant in the last advantage cited is the first
major disadvantage. Such disadvantage lies in the very fact
that objects cf expenditure are easier to grasp and therefor
dominate the budget review process. The result can be that
"one does not see the forest for tne trees." Excessive
attention devoted to detailed objects means increasingly
less attenticn being devoted to the larger and mere
important program issues. A second disadvantage is that
although facilitating control over executive discreticn in
fund expenditures, such control is of no use in determining
whether those funds have been used responsibly toward an end
cbjective. The executive may have, for example, spent the
funds on fuel, but whether such expenditure contributed to
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the attainment of an end objective is not apparent. Ttis is
a wider definition cf accountability and is more in
consonance %ith functional-program budgeting. Thirdly, the
object cf expenditure classification while providing
sufficient control over the executive was, and is,
susceptible to substantial abuse by the legislative tranch.
Influenced by constituency pressures, legislators
increasingly relied upon the object classification to ensure
that "their" specific line was included, thereby placing
narrow constituency interests over those of the nation.
While forced to recognize the advantages of object
classification, the Bureau did net immediately discard its
own ideas. Instead it was to see a continued need for
functional planning to compensate for those disadvantages of
object classifications. In this regard the Bureau of
Municipal Hesearch was perhaps the first tc recognize the
need for
"...a classification of costs in as many
different ways as there are stories to be
tcld."[ 16]
In attempting to satisfy those who would use the budget as a
mechanise of control as well as those who would use it for
planning and management, the Bureau developed a threefold
classification scheme. Costs were to he identified by
object cf expenditure, by organizational unit and by
function. In so doing, something was to be provided to
everyone. although conceptually desirable, such an approach
was in a practical sense not feasible. Lacking sufficient
numbers of planners, managers and "controllers", the system
was simply overloaded with difficulties when faced with the
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"3992 distiECt items of appropriation'^ 17 j and numerous
subdivisions thereof in the 1913 appropriations act. In
justifying its actions, the Bureau conceptually saw a
difference between the operations underlying the budget and
the process of appropriating. The former was tc te a
process of planning characterized by functicrs and analysis
whereas the latter was to satisfy a predispositicE for
control. What had not been reccgnized was that the budget
is driven by the informational demands of the
appropriation's process and, therefore, if the latter is
characterized by objects so will be the former.
While perhaps misinterpreting its own environment in
many respects, the Eureau of Municipal Sesearch did make
several significant and pioneering contributions, both
conceptually and empirically, at the earliest stages of
budget reform. These were
a. First, a conceptual recognition cf
budgetary functions other than the
traditional control, those being management
and more importantly, planning.
b. Secondly, a recognition cf the need for a
multiclassirication scheme tc support these
three functions.
c. Thirdly, an empirical recognition of the
struggle between the advocates cf the three
functions in determining the optimum balance.
d. Fourthly, the empirical recognition that
political and economic environments have a
determinative impact on which function
dominates. For example, given the absence of
other mechanisms, the control function
dominates.

e. Fifthly, the predominance of that
function (control, management or planning)
given explicit recognition in the
appropriations act.
The above has dealt predominantly with fcudget reform at
the municipal level, thereby identifying the point from
which reform pressures were rapidly spread to both state and
national levels. Furthermore those pressures at state and
national levels were the same as those at the municipal
level, finding their most visible support in individuals who
advocated a positivist role and those who advocated
retrenchment. So also did those pressures result in the
same struggle for proper balance between planning,
management and control that was pursued at the municipal
level.
This paper dees act discuss at length such events as
President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, its
report The Need for a National Budge t and the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921. This is not by oversight. Such
events certainly contributed to strengthening the executive
budget concept, but they did not alter the dominarce of
object of expenditure control among the functions of
budgeting. Change in the balance was net to occur until the
advent of the performance budgeting era in the 1930s.
2 • Isr f crmanc e Budget ing
Notwithstanding the sparse but continuing advocacy
for a greater degree of planning , the control function with
its concciitant objects of expenditure had become firmly
entrenched in local, state and federal governments curing
the first three decades of the 20th Century. Changing only
in degree cf refinement and growing extent cf application,
budgeting clearly bore the mark cf its time - a lingering
distrust of government. But just as the emphasis on control
was a product of its time, so also was a growing emphasis on
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management tc be a product of the second three decades.
As an addition to, but never replacing, the ccntrol
function, the managerial efficiency orientation was to be
occasioned by several gradual developments. First among
these was the rapid growth in public expenditures. Whereas
in 1906 federal expenditures were only $570 million, they
reached $4.2 billion in 1932 and by 1940 were at an all time
high of $10 billion. Rapid growth not withstanding,
magnitude alone was substantial if net sufficient impetus
for continuing budget reform. As a ccntrol mechanism,
objects cf expenditure and line items were to come to
represent smaller and smaller segments cf the fcudget
relative to an ever increasing total and thus a snaller
degree cf leverage on the whole. Such leverage was
diminished further by the growth of an increasingly more
complex governmental structure. With the same organization
providing a multitude of different services and vice versa,
a single function being performed by a multitude of
agencies, the once adeguate cbject classification was proven
tc be inadequate in untangling "who was dcing what with
which resources. " With its diminishing usefulness, however,
came increasing numbers of line items and objects rendering
the control function even less effective, more cumbersome
and costly. This too was to be a stimulus fcr change.
rortunately, paralleling the rapid tudget growth and
diminishing importance of line items were developments that
yculd facilitate the required reorientation cf budget usage
frcm control tc management. Perhaps mest important of
these, expansion of the public sector reflected a growing
recognition that government was net necessarily an
undesirable activity but did in fact provide substantial
henefits. Eudgeting, instead of a means tc restrict the
government and its chief executive, came tc re recognized as
a tccl tc be used in achieving those benefits. The average
taxpayer, particularly the businessman, although quite
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satisfied to receive the benefits, was however interested in
faying as little as possible. Seeing in a management
orientation possibilities of economy and efficiency,
taxpayers were in the front lines of support.
Administrators also recognized the advantages of the
efficiency orientation or performance budgeting as it in
time came tc be called. In performance budgeting the
official saw his opportunity to portray tc the ungrateful
taxpayer in detailed factual terms the products of his
contributions. Finally a budget could be presented in "take
it or leave it" terms, something very difficult to do when
portraying costs on an object basis. Said one school
official in rather flowery terms
"Instead of thinking of mcney alone ...
citizens should hear children singing in the
spring concert, ...feel that schccl roofs are
tight and walls are safe, see the pupils in
the corridors washing their dirty hands and
drying their clean ones ... A top performance
budget paints pictures in words that justify
the expenditure ."[ 18
]
Of no less importance, a myriad of smaller developments
were alsc tc be conducive tc a greater management
crientaticn. Whereas reformers of the 1910s had no
alternatives to object of expenditure ccntrol, the same was
net true of the late 1930s and early 1940s. 3y that time a
number of administrative regulations and public statutes had
been set fcrth to mitigate against public malfeasance.
Civil service reform and the mail system, competitive
bidding atd centralized purchasing, wage scales,
substantially improved accounting and audit procedures ail
served to free the budget from some cf its ccntrol
functions. Ihese developments - both the grcwing magnitude
cf the public sector and the means cf accemmodating such
growth - began to cenverge in the 1930s, reaching a focal
point in the New Deal years.
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The first comprehensive efforts to reorient tudget
usage came in 1934 at the hands of the U. S. Department of
Agriculture and in 1936 by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
As envisioned by the Eureau of Municipal Research, they too
saw an increased program-planning role for the budget and
conseguently pushed the frontiers of budget usage in that
direction. That they mistook a perceived need for planning
in place of the actual efficiency-economy thrust cf the
times was not to change the end product. Just as the Eureau
twenty-eight years earlier was to pursue planning but accept
fiduciary control, so also were current reformers to pursue
planning but accept management control. The Department of
Agriculture effort was a restructuring of the budget in
terms of projects and within projects, schedules of
activities fcr accomplishment. Through this restructuring,
the Uniform Project System, as it cane to be called,
portrayed resource requirements according to the work to be
accomplished and the resulting specific products. The
second effort was that of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) . Ey developing a program budgeting and accounting
system that linked the organizational unit, its "activities"
(smaller subdivisions of. work) and encompassing programs,
1VA was to provide and demonstrate the use cf a mechanism
fcr management control and progress measurement.
Even at the Bureau of the Budget, once "concerned cnly
with the humble and routine"[ 19 ] tasks of fiscal control,
times were changing. In 1937 President Roosevelt's
Commissicn cf Administrative Management, also known as the
Erownlow Ccimissicn, severely criticized the Eureau's
inadequate staffing (forty persons), predisposition towards
control and lack cf management orientation. Such
predisposition was tc change in 1939 with transfer cf the
Eureau frcm the Treasury Department to the Executive Cffice
of the President. Simultaneous release of Executive Order
8248 on September 8 changed its role in the budget process





. . . to keep the President informed of the
progress of activities by agencies of the
government with respect to wcrk proposed,
work actually initiated, and work completed
. .
.
; all to the end that the monies
appropriated by the Congress may te expended
in the most economical manner possitle ..."
/
The predominant concern for progress and economy as is
evident in the above quote was to motivate increasing
numbers of agencies during World War II to accept the
management function as being as important if not more
important than the traditional control function.
Accompanying the introduction of program and activity
structure was the development of workload measures, unit
costs and standards of performance. New York State for
example, in its use of managerial accounting concepts,
separated fixed from variable costs and by sc doing was able
to compute unit costs for the food service and laundry
functions. Pioneered by agencies such as the Census Bureau,
Bureau of Reclamation and Forest Service, these innovations
were to provide the first indicators of effectiveness and
efficiency by describing not only the degree to which given
end objectives were accomplished but the manner in which
accomplished. Further innovative use of these indicators
was made by agencies like the Post Office which, by
identifying the number of letters that could be processed by
one individual, found a means of projecting future manpower
requirements.
This new management orientation to budgeting was to
spread rapidly through federal, stats and local government
in the years following Wcrld War II. Encouraged by the
atmosphere of reform and the new role defined for the Eureau
of the Eudget, emphasis on fiscal control began to diminish
and be altered by the new management orientation. Ml these
developments culminated in the First Hoover Commission of





recognition to the budget's
recommendation:
new "face" by its first
"we recommend that the whole budgetary
concept of the Federal Government should be
replaced by the adoption of a budget based on
functions, activities, and projects: this we
designate a 'performance budget'."
Perhaps lore important than official recognition of
"performance budgeting" was the Commission's objective of
altering budget classification away from the things to be
bought, persistently surviving despite the new emphasis,
toward the work to be done. Such was not to be an easy task
and continues to this day. First steps in this direction
occurred in the same year with passage of the National
Security Act. Congress therein expressed its approval of
performance budgeting by directing that the Department of
Eefense budget estimates
"... shall be prepared, presented andjustified, where practicable, and authorized
programs shall be administered, in such form
and manner ... so as to account for, and
report^ the cost of performance of readily
identiriable programs and activities ..."
That it was serious in its directive was attested to by the
establishement of a controller for the entire Department of
Defense and each of its services, tasked explicitly with
developing and i mp lenient in g the new budget methodology.
Congressional support for the performance budget concept was
further demonstrated by the Eudget and Accounting Procedures
Act of 1950, which extended performance budgeting to the
entire federal government. That the number cf Congressional
appropriations shrank from approximately 200C prior to World
War II to 375 by 1955 was ample evidence that the above
directives were more than mere formality but instead were a
shift in the way budget offices and Congressional committees
carried on their business.
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Just as performance budgeting obtained its initial
support from diverse advocates, so also was its success to
be measured from different perspectives. Performance
budgeting was initially conceived in the minds of budget
reformers as the means of planning and pursuing national
objectives. In this context it succeeded in leaving a
legacy of program structure on which future reforms were to
build but failed as a basis upon which top management
decisions could be made. With its emphasis on the work to
be accomplished (i.e., activities) and development of
indicators to measure the performance of such work (i.e.,
unit costs and standards)
,
performance oudgeting came to be
recognized as a tool of management control exercised
predominantly at lower levels of an organization. While the
work to be accomplished at the lowest levels of an
organization was normally guantifiable, aggregates of such
work become increasingly more difficult to guantify as one
moves higher in the organization. Whereas knowing
"...that it cost $.07 to wash a pound of
laundry or that the average postal employee
can process 289 items of mail per
hour.. ."[ 20]
may be tremendously meaningful for those at the lowest
levels charged with preparing and executing the budget, such
knowledge would not be very helpful for those faced with
choice between puclic investments - the policy maKers. Not
suprisingly performance budgeting has continued to be of use
to lower management levels even to this day although
referred to under different names such as productivity
measurement and certain manpower management systems. Higher
aggregations of costs and output (benefits) conducive to
policy making and planning, were to oe the product of the




III. PLANNINGX PROGRAMMING ANC BUDGETING 1PFB1
Despite its apparent failure to meet the planning
objectives of budget reformers, Performance Budgeting had
pushed the frontiers of budgeting forward in two respects.
First was its shift in budget emphasis frcm predoiinant
concern hith input, that is the resources to be used, to
considerations also of output. Secondly, and largely a
derivative cf the first, was the appearance of a structured
framework of programs, functions and activities from which
the resource allocation guestion could be viewed. That
neither aspect found much application at the time was
perhaps net indicative of weakness in concept tut,
practically speaking, inability to accomodate such cencept
by "state of the art" management abilities. As a
conseguence, Performance Budgeting provided unused potential
in the fcrm cf a program-planning concept and structure that
lacked the proper environment for growth.
fly 1961 the latent potentials of Performance Budgeting
had been aroused sufficiently to provide a basis upon which
the next decade and a half of budget reform was to both
flourish and in the end flounder. The period's principle
contribution, the Planning, Programming and Eudgeting (FP3)
cencept, resulted frcm a significant shift in balance
between the control, management and planning functions.
This shift, definitely in the direction of greater planning
emphasis, was as in previous reforms a product cf the




"The critical mass for the change came from 3
sectors; economics, the new data sciences and
planning. "[ 21
]
That the above developments were necessary for EFE is
unarguable; that they were a sufficient basis for PPB cannot
be argued if one is to review the evidence accumulated in
the last fifteen years. In keeping with what has been
written so far, it is the author's ccntention that EPE is
the forerunner and not too distant relative of zerc-case
budgeting. That such is the case will become clearer as
this paper progresses. Conseguently what occurred during
the PPB reform era, particularly the success, failures and
their underlying causes, is most pertinent tc the pursuit of
zero-base budgeting and will therefore be explored in the
following paragraphs. A most useful context for doing so is
to first examine the rise of PP3 and what some might
consider its one real instance of success, the Department of
Defense application; secondly to give an operational
definition of PPB; thirdly to appraise civilian agency
efforts, mostly unsuccessful, tc implement EFB; and finally
a comparison of successes and failures tc determine the
underlying causes.
A. THE RISE OF PPB
In that PPB or program budgeting, as referred tc in a
mere generic sense, was always the ideal of early hudget
reformers, it is difficult to say when it first occurred.
Eerhaps uncharacteristic of its predecessors, this latest of
reforms found its impetus not only in the budget reform
movement itself out in developing technologies for the mest
part removed from cencern for budgeting. The first of these
was the growing school of macro- and micr oeccnomic thcught.
Arising from the Great Depression period, Keynesian
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economics gave explicit recognition tc the rule of
governmental activity in maintaining the health of private
sector economic conditions. Fiscal policy, the professed
means by which government was to accomplish this
maintenance, opened new horizons for the pursuit of eccncmic
(e.g., full employment) and societal objectives. The
relatively simple rules of Keynesian doctrine - greater
spending when employment is down and less spending when
employment is up - were rapidly accepted by politician and
civil servant alike. Inherent to both rules was the ability
tc control the level cf government, expenditures and, at the
time, the accepted means of doing so was the budget.
Whereas fiscal policy became the means to achieve eccncmic
goals, budgeting became the means to pursue fiscal policy,
furthermore cnce one has agreed upon the budget as a means
cf pursuing such policy, the next question to be asked is -
in what way can the budget best pursue the stated policy,
i.e., what is the optimum mix and level of expenditures?
flcving from macro level considerations, such as that of
spending mere or less, to the micro questions of mix and
level, micrceconomics was introduced to the public sector
and was to beccme the essence of program budgeting. That it
did not do so right away was the result of several factors.
First, bcth macro- and microeconomic considerations of
expenditure were constrained by total revenue. Although the
expenditure side of fiscal policy gained rapid acceptance,
the cojicept of a flexible tax structure designed to consider
the same macro and micro questions was slower in evolving.
As it gained acceptance, program budgeting was at least to
seme degree freed from arbitrary totals, and both
expenditure and tax policy were allowed tc pursue a more
natural, unconstrained evolution.
Secondly, although the relationship cf macroeccncmic
analyses and the microeconomic considerations of budgeting
are evident, organizational accommodation of this
relationship did not, and has net, occurred. The 1946 Full
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Employment Act established the Council of Economic Advisors
and tasked it with fiscal analysis and policy iiaking
responsibilities. Separate and distinct was the Bureau of
the Budget whose primary responsibility was that of
aggregating, from the bottom up, and compiling a budget
document. The lack of institutional arrangement between the
two and, ir conseguence, the separate roles and behaviors
precluded the systematic definition and pursuit of
objectives.
Thirdly, just as an acceptance of Keynesian doctrine was
tc reguire time, so also was the application of
microeconomics in the design of expenditure policy to
require much work. As so aptly put by Shick
"Microeconomics had been elevated to public
prominence largely en the coattails of its
macro partner. Yet considerably less is
understood about the mix of public
expenditures than about the aggregates. "[ 22 ]
In hoping to find objective economic criteria for
determining the optimum mix cf programs, welfare economists
were to be faced with a long uphill struggle of seeking to
guantify the inherently unquantif iable government
activities. Program budgeting is part cf that uphill
struggle
.
That program budgeting was not overwhelmed by the
troublesome difficulties outlined above attests tc the
presence cf other significant and perhaps more supportive
factors. Although net specifically designed to help the
welfare economists in their pursuit, the separate maturing
of a number cf informational technologies was to be of
substantial help. Developed by mathematicians, physicists
and engineers as early as 1872 in British war gaming, the
Operations Hesearch discipline was tc grow under the
influence of World War II into a highly useful mears of
optimizing manpower, materials and equipment in repetitive,-
quantifiable operations. Its techniques of linear
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programming and game theory, although highly quantitative,
were particularly useful in the analysis of data.
Cost-benefit analysis, dating as far back as 1844 but really
coming of age in the 1950s, proved to be a useful means of
analyzing ccsts and benefits of non-repetitive programs.
General systems theory, arising out of work in the
biological sciences in the 1920s, portrayed systems not as
entities but as inter-connected units, each relating tc the
ether in different but systematic ways. Cybernetics,
another discipline, was developed as the science of
communication and brought with it the concept of probahilism
as a replacement of determinism. [ 23 ] Developed in 1823 by
Charles Eatbage, the beginnings of a computer technology and
its subsequent evolution, although not an information
technology itself, enabled the others to cccur and at least
tc some extent served as the "matchmaker", bringing the
diverse technologies together into what is often referred to
as systems analysis. Borrowing from each of the other
disciplines, systems analysis is often defined as
"...nothing more than quantitative or
enlightened common sense aided by modern
analytical techniques ."[ 24 ]
Although unable to establish a specific date for its
appearance, it is clear that the problems of the Department
cf Defense in the 1950s provided tne setting from which not
only systems analysis was to emerge but also upon which the
traditions cf budget reform and economic thought were to
converge
.
£. THE GEFENSE SETTING
The Department of Defense was fertile ground fcr the
growth cf program budgeting. Althougn formal implementation
of a "program package budgeting" system (as PPB was then
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called) did not occur until 1961, Defense had gathered
considerable experience in analysis and decision iraking
along prcgran lines. David Novick, considered by most to be
the father of program budgeting, first developed the ccncept
in 1941, called the Production Reguirements Plan, in
ccnnecticn with allocation of commodities to competing
needs. Although refined and used during World War II as the
Controlled Materials Plan, its basic intent regained
unchanged - the allocation of goods along program lines.
From a mere conventional perspective, the Navy Department in
1946 had gained considerable experience from its
presentation of the fiscal year 1948 budget in both line
item and program format, an effort that was tc prove ecually
influential in the first Hoover Commission. Defense had
also gained considerable experience in using the inforiration
technologies mentioned in the preceeding section. In fact
many of them had been developed under the spensorship cf the
Department and individual Services by such "think, tanks" as
the RAND Corporation. Not surprisingly it was under the
auspices of the RAND Corporation that David Novick ii 1956
recommended the development cf a program budgeting system
fcr Defense. [25]
These early pursuits of program budgeting anc the
various informational technologies were tc prove anything
but academic. They were instead responses tc a growinc need
fcr management tools that would span all three services. By
the end cf World War II what had once teen a peculiar
mission cf each service, whether it be land, sea or air, was
no longer the exclusive province of that service. Air
ccmbat had, for example, become a mission of each cf the
three services and each was to compete fiercely for its own
aircraft weapons systems. That such ccnpetition was to
prove net enly characteristic but also inefficient and
ccstly prompted the consideration of cross service programs.
Where three aircraft might normally satisfy the parcchial
interests of each service, one aircraft designed to meet the
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requirements of all three services might best satisfy the
national interest.
Furthermore, preoccupation with the fixed budget ceiling
idea for Cefense to which both Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower were committed, did nothing tc better the
situation. As one reformer was to point out -
"...prescribing a single fixed ceiling in
advance for subordinate levels of the
executive branch involves the danger ofjudginq a case before the evidence is heard.
...how'can one be sure that the ceiling for
one function is not set too high and the
ceiling for another too low? M [26]
In this regard performance budgeting did little tc answer
the soon-to-be-asked guesticn, "How much is needed for
defense mere than it is needed for other pur p cses?" (26 ) For
after all, hew can one measure the degree of efficiency
attained in the pursuit of deterrence. Although peace is an
adeguate measure of effectiveness, its maintenance may be
achieved by expending sums substantially in excess of
optimum, whatever that might be. The same gees for other
concepts like massive retaliation and preparedness. The
early experiences of the 1940s and 1950s bcth in program
budgeting aid the information technologies, although ad hoc
in nature, were to provide the foundation for pursuit of
budget reform and, in so doing, cf solutions to many Defense
problems
.
1 • defense FPE - An Operational Definition
Despite the fertile ground provided by the Defense
Department in the 1950s, the growth of program budgeting and
development cf the formal Defense Planning, Erogramming and
Eudgeting System (PPBS) were to await further impetus. Ecth
the catalyst and agent for change was to be the appointment
cf Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense. Faced with a
blurring of missions, increasing costs, particularly these
resulting frcm errors, shrinking response times and the
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pernicious practice of fixed ceiling budgets, McNamara was
presented with the decision of either managing the
Department as a whole cr continuing in the rcle, ineffectual
though it was, of umpire in a highly fragmented, competitive
game between the individual services.
In cho-osing the former, McNamara was faced with a
second problem, how to manage the Department- He was later
to write that the problem
"...was not the lack of management
authority... The problem was rather the
absence of the essential management
tools. .. "[27 ]
McNamara solved this difficulty by combining the legal
authority vested in his position by Eisenhower's Defense
Eecrganizaticn Message of 1958 and the considerable
knowledge gained by a staff of former HAND Corporation
employees. Ey "stacking" his staff with those who had
pioneered the new decision making technologies, McNamara was
to be able to more fully integrate not only the activities
of Defense but also the overall functions of planning,
control and nanageraent
.
The problems to which McNamara and his staff turned
were not new but revolved around the issue repeatedly
emphasized in budget reform literature, i.e., the
introduction of planning considerations at the front end of
the budgetary process. Prior to his arrival there was,
practically speaking, no connection between planning dene by
the military and budgeting, a responsibility of the civilian
secretariat. What integration of planning and budgeting did
exist was in name only. The Basic National Security Eclicy
(ENSE) issued by the National Security Council was
supposedly to kick off the budget process. Designed to be a
complete and thorough statement of defense policy, it was
for practical purposes, not able to resolve disagreements on
what the defense policy should be. Instead of providing
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specific guidance, it became a statement of generalities
acceptable tc all whc had a role in its preparation. Its
utility as a basis for developing the second planning
document, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSCP) was
therefore sharply diminished. Prepared by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), the JSOP was to be a two volume document
that first assessed the threat and then described the
military force and weapon levels necessary to meet the
threat and defense policies described in the BNSP. The JSOP
was in turn to be used by each of the individual services as
a basis for budget preparation. Unfortunately the general
guidance of the BNSP was just as, if not more, acceptable to
the Service Chiefs as to its preparers. Its generalities
could be interpreted in many ways, and so they were ty each
of the individual services in preparing a budget that
enhanced its own parochial interests. Lacking a mechanism
for enforcing cross service plans and programs, each service
could claim that it had to provide the bulk of national
security. Notwithstanding the existing fixed ceiling tudget
ccncept, such philosophy led the individual services to
freguently ask for more than their assigned allocation by as
much as fifteen percent. [28] To meet the ceiling imposed by
the President (Eisenhower steadfastly maintained that no
mere than than ten percent of the Gross National Product
should gc for Defense) the Secretary of Defense was forced
into a budget cutting role, albeit without sufficient
information to make reductions. It is net suprisinc that
the reductions made were on a horizontal basis and that
throughout the period 1947 to x 961 service budgets varied
not substantially from a fixed twenty-nine percent for the
Navy, forty-seven percent for the Air force and twenty-four
percent fcr the Army.
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a. McNaraara's Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System
To correct the deficiencies cf the period,
including the inadeguate integration of planning and
budgeting and the resulting duplication, parochialism,
protecti veness, short sightedness and irraticnal reductions,
McNamara and his Assistants Charles Hitch and Alain Enthcven
designed a formal decision making process referred to
hereafter as the Planning, Programming and Eudgeting System
(PPES) . As EPBS was to evolve, it was to prove to be not
just a reenaphasis of the separate planning, management and
control functions historically at the center of tudget
reform, tut instead a systematic intermixing of these three
functions with primary importance being attached tc the
planning segment. What is to follow will be a description,
and therein a definition, of PPES as it evolved in the
Department of Defense. Consideration of the framework, both
internal and external, in which the process operates will
also be described.
At the heart of the entire process lay the Five
Year Defense Program (FYDP) . The FYDP in essence was, and
still is, a scheduling of all Defense activities organized
along mission lines and crossing service boundaries in terms
cf forces, projected for eight years, and resources
(manpower and costs)
,
projected for five years. The
planning, programming and budgeting process was merely a
systematic neans cf updating the FYDP base from which mere
detailed tudgets could be prepared.
Just as the name implies, PPES involves the
three stages of planning, programming and budgeting as
separate but nevertheless systematically related stages in a
resource allocation process. Although changing somewhat in
later years, McNamara 's planning process (1961-1968) was to
be a comprehensive analysis of intelligence, -technological
^rejections, military threat and strategic and tactical
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designs. The product was to be the definition of forces and
weapons needed to assure national security and the
performance of subsidiary defense missions. To accomplish
this, the planning process itself consisted of four
consecutive phases best characterized by the documents
produced therein. The frst document, JSOP Volume I,
reflected a mid-range (five year) threat assessment
performed ty the JCS. Like its predecessor before 1961 and
even though the professed cornerstone of the budget process,
JSOP Volume I was to continue as little more than an
aggregation cf the seperate Service assessments. As such it
was to be given little attention by Secretary KcNamara in
his decision making process. The second and third stages
including the Service-Unified Command and JCS (JSOP Volume
II) recommended force levels were given equally short
attention since they too had been based en the original
planning document that McNamara, for non-partisan political
reasons, was forced to tolerate. In reality the planning
process was begun with HcNamara*s Draft Presidential
Memorandum (DPM) . Prepared by his systems analysts
initially for review by the Secretary, then the Services and
subsequent submission to the President, each DPM
"...combined strategy, force requirements and
financial considerations..." and "...spelled
out concisely the assumptions, rationale and
supporting analysis. .. "[29 ]
for each cf the ten major programs, i.e., strategic fcrces,
general purpose forces, etc. As such they were the basic
tool by which KcNamara was tc gain control ever and drive
the resource allocation process within the Department of
Defense.
In that the DPM combined both strategy, force and
financial considerations, it represented net only the final
stage of the planning process but also the beginning cf the
programming process. Beginning with the Secretary's
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nsideraticn of the DPMs, the programming process was to
elude further review by each of the services, subsequent
commendations for change to the DPids and basic FYEF and
nally Secretarial decisions. That the DPM wculd
entually fcecome the Secretary's change tc the basic FYDP
less otherwise challenged, was sufficient to cause both
e individual Services and the JCS tc promptly request
anges, knewn as Program Change Requests (ECR) . Averaging
ring these early years 300 annually frcm the Services
one, these PCRs were for the most part rejected by the
fice of Systems Analysis as being either tco costly, poor
alyses and/or of insufficient priority when compared to
e basic five year plan. The Secretary's responses to the
E were called Program Change Decisions (PCD) and were the
sis upen which the individual Services were to update the
DP.
Following the PCDs and individual Service update cf the
DP came the budget phase. At least theoretically each of
e Services was to convert its portion of the first program
ar in the FYDP tc the more conventional, detailed
ne- item/object of expenditure format demanded by Congress,
iven by the old FYDP base and changes thereto as reflected
the DPM-PCR-PCD process, the budget was tc be a
ree-fall" document representing the nation's true defense
quirements rather than aggregations of Service requests
bitrarily constrained by fixed ceilings as before. The
fense budget was not so easily to be ccapleted however,
xious tc enhance their power, Service budgets frequently
cesded initial program estimates to a significant degree,
rthermcre, ttcNamara's assertion that the country cculd
ford whatever level of defense was required was perhaps
ue in theory but, as most of the flag rank and Service
aiysts recognized, a bit idealistic. Eudget ceilings,
though not explicitly set as in the Truman and Eisenhower
as, were implicitly recognized by those involved in the
source allocation prccess as a question cf politics more
U3

than analysis. An equally important factor behind the
development of budget requirements was the continuing
evolution of defense needs. Programs conceived in the
initial planning stage as much as fifteen months earlier had
changed to meet new conditions as had aisc the associated
ccsts. This too was behind much of the budget "excess"
requested by the Services. The job of separating the "wheat
from the chaff" in Service budgets, complicated by all of
the above, fell to the Defense Comptroller who in turn made
recommendations to the Secretary by a Subject/Issue process
which scon came to be called "Operation Snowf lake ."[ 30 ]
Having reviewed the issues and having mads a tentative
decision thereon, the applicable Service was given the
opportunity tc accept or reclama. In either case the
Secretary eventually finalized the Issue, the results of
which were then reflected in the President's Eudget
submitted to Congress.
One can easily get lost in the acronyms and steps of
McNamara's EEBS process. What has been outlined above is a
somewhat abbreviated version of a much more complex decision
making apparatus. It is however sufficient to illustrate
the methodology acNamara used in introducing a greater
degree of planning into the overall budget process. Prior
to continuing with a quick look at tne changes mace by
subsequent administrations, it would be meaningful to
briefly summarize the more important characteristics of
Defense PPBS at the time. These are:
-Perhaps first and most importantly
McNamara's extremely strong leadership.
was
-Secondly the considerable amount of
preliminary work accomplished by the various




-Thirdly, through jcint effort of the above
two, tne development of a defense wide
program structure oriented to national
security purposes vice parochial service
interests.
-Fourthly, the development and promulgation
of strategic guidance, in the DEM if not by
the JSOP, both iron the top and frcnt end of
the decision making process.
-Fifthly, long range resource allocation
decisions were to be a product of the
planning and programming phase with budgetinc
confined to a detailed costing of those
decisions.
Although a significant improvement over the pre-1961 budget
methodology and its difficulties, iicNamara's system with the
above characteristics was also to have its difficulties.
The most important problem, to which later Administrations
addressed themselves, was the degree of centralization. In
effect, strategic plans, program decisions and tudget
decisions were made by the Secretary Kith the aid of a
Comptroller and Systems Analysis staff. A power unto
itself, McNamara's group tolerated no intrusion by either
the National Security Council (NSC) or the Eureau of the
Eudget (EOB) . In fact some went so far as to state that
national fiscal policy was forced to adapt to defense cclicy
rather than vice versa. [31] Furthermore, KcNamara's short
treatment of the military's JSOP and reliance on the DPM
relegated the JCS and the Services to the role of responding
rather than initiating. Those who were tc execute the plans
had little to say as to what was or should be included -
hardly a participatory management approach. That such an
approach was an over-centralization of the decision making




-systems overload. Simply toe many decisions
were required of too few in too short a time
frame. Many program decisions were of
necessity made concurrent with and subsequent
to the budget process for which they were tc
be the driving fores. Furthermore, many of
these made during the proper phase, such as
the 700 budget decisions made annually by
McNamara[ 32 ] , were of highly suspect quality.
-isolation. McNamara's preoccupation with
analysis and its centralization left little
room for the more subjective but nevertheless
absolutely necessary influence of military
experience. In addition to affecting the
quality od decisions, the inability tc
participate in decisior making at the highest
levels was to seriously upset military
morale.
In retrospect, the strengths and weaknesses of McNamara's
PPES apparatus can provide a wealth of experience upon which
tc case subsequent innovations. It was certainly to do so
for the Nixon Administration which followed.
b. Laird's Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System
Ihe overall planning, programming and budgeting
concept introduced by McNamara was retained by Melvin Laird
under President Nixon's Administration. Concerned however
with the weaknesses indicated above, Nixon and Laird were tc
make two significant changes to the Defense decision making
apparatus. Eoth changes were to reduce the degree of
centralization characteristic of the McNamara era.
Ihe first such change, external to the Defense
Cepartment, occurred in the President's own national
security affairs staff. Perhaps more properly characterized
as renewed emphasis vice a change, the National Security
Council (NSC) under the leadership or Henry Kissinger was
once again tc try its hand at providing strategic guidance
to the JCS and Services. Ihe means for accomplishment was




approximately 130 of which were issued from 1968 thrcugh
1972. Unlike the BNSP, its predecessor cf the pre-1961 era,
the NSDMs provided in fairly explicit terms defense pclicy.
As President Nixon's Watergate problems intensified aid as
Kissinger's "globe-trotting" became mere frequent,
Presidential oversight decreased and the NSDMs became fewer
and fewer. Nevertheless, the decision [taking apparatus
became less concentrated than it had been arc more a part of
the President's policy making discretion.
Laird's second change was to be in the decision
making prccess of the Department itself. In essence the JCS
and Services were to be given tack the rele of defining
force level structure instead of responding to the force
proposals initiated by the Department's Systems Analysis
Office. The Systems Analysis Office was relegated to a role
of reviewing JCS and Service proposals and recommending
changes to the Secretary as might be appropriate. JCS and
the Services were however to pay a price fcr their more
important rcle. It was in essence the acceptance cf a
budget ceiling within which balanced force proposals were to
be submitted. No mere "Wish Lists" were acceptable. In
essence the roles cf Systems Analysis and those of the
Service Chiefs had been reversed. The professed concept of
a "free-fall" budget had teen replaced ty a ceiling
reflecting acre closely the economic philosophy cf the
Administration.
The mechanisms by which Laird implemented this
second change more clearly demonstrate its impact. JSCP
Volume I was to continue as before as an assessment of
threat and statement of strategies. So also was Voluire II
of the J50P to remain as before. In that neither
represented much change in their "blue sky" orientation,
both alsc continued to be largely ignored by Secretary
laird and his staff. The old DPMs, however, were replaced
ty a series cf three documents including
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-First, the strategic Guidance Memorandum
(SGM) . The SGM, promulgated by the
Secretary, was intended to be a thorough
strategic policy document for the Services
based on the NSDMs and JSOP Volume I. (Ir
practice and as mentioned before, the JSOE
volume I was largely ignored.)
-Second, the Tentative Fiscal Guidance
Mencrandum (TFGM) . The TFGM provided
tentative estimates of resource ccnstrairts
five years in the future for each Service and
certain major programs.
-Third, the Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (FGM) .
Based in part on the Administration's
economic philosophy, the Secretary
promulgates firm budget and in certain cases
program constraints. Theoretically the FGM
takes into consideration the unconstrained
force levels depicted in JSOP Volume I/i. In
practice thers is little coordination.
Nevertheless Service proposals are to be made
within such constraints.
In essence, the DPM programming documents were to be
replaced ty budget ceilings. While perhaps reminiscent of
the pre- 196 1 period such ceilings were less arbitrary since
defined in conjunction with national economic policy and, at
least theoretically, based on risk assessment provided by
the JSOPs and Service comments.
Having received the budget ceilings both JCS and the
Services were to prepare their recommendations fcr the
Secretary. The JCS recommendation, the Joint Forces
Memorandum (JFM) , defined the forces and programs which JCS
felt could be supported within the specified ceiling
constraints and outlined the associated risks whan compared
to the unconstrained JSOP Volume II. Each of the Services,
shortly thereafter, submitted its Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) outlining its recommended programs, forces
and costs. In concept the JFM was to te an independent
document providing a means of evaluating Service proposals.
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In practice it was instead an aggregation of the Service
FOHs. The remainder of the PPBS process was to regain
pretty much as before with only the name of individual
documents being changed. The Program Change Decisions, for
example, became Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) ard the
Subject/Issues of the old "Operation Sncwflake" became
Program Budget Decisions (PBD)
.
With the changes outlined above, Secretary laird
accomplished his objectives of decentralization. Just as
cver-centralization through PPBS brought en additional
problems, so decentralization within PPBS was to cure many
cf these same problems. In essence Nixon and Laird had
placed Defense more as an integral part of national economic
pclicy, introduced guidance from abeve as well as the
experience factor from below and through constraints
decreased the decision requirements of the Secretary by
forcing the Services tc make many of those decisions.
The process and practices of PPBS as developed by
McNamara and modified by Laird have been continued by
Secretaries Schlesinger and Rumsfield and for the most part
are practiced today by the Department of Defense. While
PPBS has corrected many of the deficiencies cf the pre-1961
period and Laird's innovations have made the entire process
mere workable, there remain several weaknesses in the
existing Defense resource allocation process. They include
-an inadequate planning mechanism. As
mentioned, the JSCP volumes have been for the
mest part ignored and strategic guidance
issued independently thereof. That fiscal
guidance can be issued without coordinated
plans and related risk assessment, raises
serious questions as to its validity for
other than purely economic purposes.
-coordination problems. A single EPES cycle
is a highly coordinated decision process.
There are however three such cycles on-going
at any one point in time. During the June tc
October time period Congressional review of
the budget year, PDM consideration of the
program years and JCS consideration of the
54

Slanning years are simultaneously on-going.
hile decisions on any one will affect the
other, there is no systematic process for









































































































































































































































































































Perhaps not so much a weakness as a monument to the
political (partisan and non-partisan), complex and teipcral
nature of budgeting, the above illustrates the opportunities
as well as pitfalls to which zero-base budgeting must
address itself. Furthermore, that these weaknesses are
descriptive cf the resource allocation process in Defense
today is net to imply that the budget reform movement had
stepped at the Pentagon. On the contrary, the initial
successes cf PPBS in the Department cf Defense were
sufficient te prompt President Lyndon Jchnscn to anncurce on
August 25, 1S65 that
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"This morning I have just concluded a
breakfast meeting with the Cabinet and with
the heads of federal agencies. and I am
asking each of them to immediately begin tc
introduce a very new and revolutionary system
of planning and programming and budgetinc
throughout the vast federal
government. . . "[ 33 ]
This "revolutionary system". Defense PPBS, was to be plucked
from the Pentagon and dropped in total upon the unsuspecting
civilian federal sector. Its impact was to be substantial
and its "failure" not surprising. Up to this point, only the
evolving Defense experience and the associated Defense
process have been explored. Prior to exploring civilian PPB
it is first helpful to look at the system from a conceptual
point of view as opposed to the process.
C. PPBS - A CCNCEPTUAI DEFINITION
The conceptual underpinnings of PPB are found ir. two
immutable truisms. First is the concept of scarcity. There
are simply net enough resources, men and materials, to
accomplish everything man, either in his individual or
institutional capacity, desires. Even if there should be
sufficient personnel and material resources, time alone
would be a constraining factor. As a consequence choices
must be made. The evidence and the product of such choices
comprise, in the financial sense, a budget. The second
immutable truism is the inescapable connection between
national policy f or mulaticn and execution and the
expenditure of resources. The choice of national objectives
and the allocation of scarce resources by the budget prccess
to carry out those objectives are but opposite sides of the
same coin.
Implicit in the concepts of choice and budgeting is the
need to ask such questions as
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"Hew much mere is needed for defense than is
needed for other purposes?"[ 34 ]
In perhaps a broader sense, governments must be concerned
Mith the prevision of a wide spectrum of services: defense,
health care, general welfare, education, transportatior , and
recreation, just tc name a few of its responsibilities.
Since government can neither afford to support all cf the
needs of its populace nor devote all its resources tc any
one requirement, it necessarily follows that a compromise
must be icund. But by what method should this compromise be
reached? That sucn choices will in fact be made is
inescapatle. The question which must be posed is
"...whether the answer rests on intuition and
guess, or on a budcet system that presents
relevant information so organized as tc
contribute tc rational analysis, planning and
decision making. "[35]
Early reformers and advocates of program budgeting were to
answer guestiens such as the above by saying
"...let us be deliberate choosers, changinc
our budgets and reshaping our forces as lone
as a change appears to gain mere than it
costs. "[ 36 ]
This idea of "deliberate" choice is at the heart of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPB3) .
Planning, programming and budgeting is the means by
which objectives (desired outputs) and resources (required
inputs) are deliberately chosen and by which an acceptable
balance cf competing objectives and resource reguiremerts is
attained. Mere specifically PPBS is a three stage process.
In its first stage, planning is to be a consideration of
alternative strategies and objectives including both their
expected costs and consequences. Following planning comes
programming in wnich the adopted strategic objectives are to
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be restated in terms of men and materials and their
scheduled application over time. The final stage,
budgeting, is concerned with translating the single hudget
year's portion of the long range program schedule tc the
detailed financial and resource input required by Congress.
By a systematic integration of these three stages, PPB
attempts to assist the decision maker in chcosing both the
objectives tc be pursued and the means by which they are to
be pursued. This systematic integration is achieved through
a combination of analysis and process by which top level
agency management must annually assess the validity cf its
objectives, evaluate these objectives in terms of output,
consider alternatives and relate its annual budget to longer
term plans. PPB5 accomplishes the above by providing a
structured framework in which programs fulfilling a certain
objective are grouped in major program categories,
subcategories and program elements. Early in the PFBS
process specific issues are identified by top management as
requiring in-depth analysis. Identif icaticn cf these issues
is followed by special analytic studies identifying
alternatives, costs, benefits and risks involved. Agency
decisions or recommendations and analyses with respect to
these special issues as well as the basic programs are then
summarized in program memoranda presented tc top management
for final approval. With such approval, projected resource
requirements as well as historical costs are displayed in a
program and financial plan, thereby portraying on a
multi-year (past, present and future) basis the impact of
past and present resource allocation decisions. The budget
year column cf the program and financial plan then becomes
the basis for development of the more detailed, input
oriented budget documentation.
An alternative means of defining PPfi in conceptual
terms is to contrast it with the opposing view of budgeting
offered by Charles Lindolccm
.[ 37 ] The decision process
referred to as incrementaiism and associated with Charles E.
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Lindblocm wculd attack the rational approach of EPE as
unrealistic. The incrementalist* s argument is based on
several prepositions. First, social objectives to be
pursued and maximized by the rational approach are in
conflict. One need only cbserve as evidence the conflict
between environmentalists and oil companies surrounding
construction of the Alaskan pipeline. Secondly, social
values are tco complex to reduce to specific objectives.
Even if one could reduce values to specific objectives, the
conflict emerging between proponents and opponents wculd
render such objectives unattainable. Therefore values
should be allowed to remain ambiguous, each party reading
into the value what he desires. Thirdly, because social
values are sc complex, they can be interpreted only as the
decision maker examines a specific proposal for pursuing a
particular value. As a consequence, the incrementalist
defines his values as he considers specific alternatives
whereas the rationalist seeks to define his objectives
first. Fourthly, because of the complex nature and conflict
surrounding social values, it is difficult if not impossible
to foresee the consequences of resource allocations. It,
therefore, behooves the decision maker to move in small
incremental steps, correcting and modifying as he proceeds.
Because of the inherent risk in large decisions, analysis is
confined tc those cptiens which differ not tec significantly
from the status quo. Implications for the budget process
are that one does not "tinker" with the base itself but
locks only at the increases or decreases.
In the preceding two paragraphs, two seemingly cptcsing
concepts of budgeting have been compared - first PPE which
professes rationalism and secondly incrementaiism which
testifies tc non-rationality. Actually the two are further
appart in concept than in practice. In contrast with the
incrementalist, advocates of the Planning, Programming and
Eudgeting (PFBS) approach to decision making would net argue
with the realistic interpretation given by the
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incrementalist to th€ decision environment. They iraintain
instead that the conflict, complexity, and risk outlined in
the previous paragraph are all the icre reascn to
systematically ferret cut the irrelevant factors and focus
the decision maker's attention on the relevant issues.
Beccgnizing the ambiguity and conflict surrounding values,
the PP3S advocate contends that decision makers cannot
effectively argue whether program characteristics will meet
a given national need unless they are stated in terms of
output. The process of moving from program characteristics
to program output is the essence of PPBS. Ej systematically
analyzing and offering the decision maker alternative
programs and program levels, value judgements can be refined
by a more educated debate in the political arena. [38] This
is best summed up as
".. .render (ing) unto analysis the things that
are analysis's and unto judgement the things
that are judgement ' s." [ 39 J
The fact that budgeting is, above all else, a political
process renders the dichotomy between the rationalism of
PPBS and the incrementalism of Lindbloom less significant
than one at first might believe. That this is so can be
illustrated. Incremental budgeting (budgeting from the
bcttom-up without top-down planning) is more than a little
like "driving a car while looking in the rear view mirror."
Decisions are based not so much upon where one wants to go
as where one has been. By incrementalizing the base and
thereby projecting past decisions into the future, it might
be expected that the trend cf appropriated funds for a
stable organization from year to year would be linear. As
reflected in Figure (1) a plot of Department of Defense
appropriations over the period 1950-1978, and despite the
anomalies cf tne Korean and Vietnam War years, such
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Y = a + bX + c
where "a" equals the base, "b" equals the annual increment
and "c M equals the unknown "noise", can be fitted to actual
appropriation figures with a goodness cf fit of .82
notwithstanding the twc war anomalies. Whether a straight
linear cr perhaps better fitting curvilinear type, as
explored in much greater sophistication by Aaron Wilcavsky
in his search for predictive Models of budgeting [4C] the
relationship of past to present is nevertheless undeniably
significant.
The most interesting and enlightening aspect of Figure
(1) is found in a comparison of pre-PPB Defense budgets with
those of the ?PB era (1961-1977) . As the reader may recall,
EPE is ccncerned first of all with the setting of objectives
and then analyzing the extent to which alternative prcgrams
and the assoviated full costs contribute tc these
objectives. In this context, the base is sacrosanct only to
the extent that it continues to be not only consistent with
the objectives bur can in fact compete favorably with the
alternatives. In such an environment it would net be
unreasonable tc expect that Defense appropriations might
lack continuity from one year to the next. If true, a
cemparative analysis of time series data for the two eras,
discarding the war perturbations tor the sake of clarity,
should show a substantial reduction in gecdness of fit for
the PPc period. However, as shown in Figures (2) and (3),
pre-PPB and EPB eras repectively, the goodness of fit does
not decrease but in fact increases slightly from .914 to
.917. In further illustration is Figure (4) which depicts
total Navy appropriations over the period 1965 to 1978 with
a goodness cf fit of .91.
That the character of the budget process appears to
remain unchanged, and perhaps appears tc be even mere
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should it te deduced that the rationalism of PPE has no
impact. Cn the contrary, budgeting under PEE retains the
appearance cf incrementalism, notwithstanding the on-going
analysis of the base and increment alike, for several
reasons.
First of all, regardless of the process used in
compiling the budget, the manner in which the ceiling itself
is set is both incremental and political. Over eighteen
months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, the
Eresident and his Council of Economic Advisors project
expected revenues and demands as a basis for assigning
tentative ceilings to the various departments. In
forecasting next year's expected revenues, which to a large
extent are dependent upon the state of the economy, the
President and Council necessarily start with the current
state of the economy. In the same fashion expected demands
for next year are derived by looking at the demands
expressed by last year's budget. From a macro point of view
then, the upcoming overall budget is an incremental cne.
Hew much cf that increment gees to Defense is a question of
values that is necessarily defined in a democracy by the
political process. On the cne hand is the liberal who would
seek fulfillment of social and domestic needs while
restraining massive defense expenditures. Cn the other hand
is the conservative who, decrying the extent cf governirental
interference, would seek to limit social and domestic
programs while strengthening national defense. The product
cf the President's early spring guidance and cf the ensuing
pciitical process is the annual increment to the Defense
budget. Ihat the Defense increment should be distributed
rationally by systematically analyzing old as well as new
Defense programs, instead of merely building upon the eld as
Lindblocm professes, is the essence of PEE. At best the
rationalism of PPB can assist the President and the
pciitical process in the conversion of values to attainable
objectives. It cannot however be a substitute.
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Secondly, in a more micro sense. Defense PPB is of
necessity mere incremental, albeit rationally so, than its
theory would imply. There does exist a base, the Five Year
Defense Program, to which increments and decrements are
made. The key is that both the base and changes thereto are
reviewed annually to ensure consistency with overall
objectives. The base is composed of, as the name implies,
long range programs or investment decisions with each year
representing progressive implementation. The inclusion of
such long range investments in the FYDP necessarily gives it
continuity from year to year.
Finally the rationality of PPPS is constrained by a
number of practical factors. Just, mentioned was the number
of long -era investments. The sunk costs and commitments
made under those programs also provide an anchoring effect
which must be outweighed by expected benefits if change is
to occur. That such change does not frequently occur is due
to the intense pressure brought by interest groups, anc as a
result by politicians, who perceive a loss in sunk costs or
future benefits if the program is terminated. Thus the
dichotomy between Lindblccm's increraentalisra and the
rationalism of PPB is narrowed even further.
The purpose of the foregoing has not been to denigrate
PP3 or to imply that there is no difference between
Lindbloom's "science of muddling through", as his
incrementalism has come to be called, and PPE as i upleiiented
in Defense. Although both appear to be incremental, as
illustrated in Figures (1) thru (4), one is characterized by
"muddling through" while the other is characterized by
deliberate choice. The intent however is to place the
rational approach to budgeting in proper perspective and
thereby prevent its haing oversold as a panacea for all
resource allocation problems. Evidence tc the effect that
the rational approach, such as PPB or zero-base budgeting
(as will be seen) , can work with substantial benefit is
provided by the Defense experience. Tnat the perspective
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from which the Defense experience must be viewed is cne of
"bounded rationality", that is constrained by the political,
social and economic environment, is not easily accepted by
budget refomers who advocate choice on purely economic
grounds. As demonstrated by the "apparent" increraentalism
of the Defense PPB era, this "bounded rationality" must be
accepted by budget reformers as the goal to be attained.
That this fact was lost upon many budget reformers in the
1960s and 1970s has resulted in the overselling of PPB and
currently zero-base budgeting.
Having given a conceptual definition of PPB and having
contrasted it with the purely incremental and purely
rational interpretations of budgeting, it is now appropriate
to examine the fate of PPB in the civilian federal sector.
The overselling of PPE was to be perhaps the most important
of the factors contributing to its demise.
E. PPB IN THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN SECTOR
Notwitnstanding President Johnson's news conference of
August 25, 1965, PPB was launched on a short but net so
sweet career in the civilian branches of the federal
bureaucracy. Drawing upon the initial successes of the
Defense department, the Bureau of the Budget's guidance
depicted a system that closely resembled that of the
Pentagon. In essence, the only changes made were in the
names of the various decision processes and resulting
documents. The FYDP became the Program and Financial Plan
(PFP) and, regardless of name, continued to depict a
structure of program elements, program subcategories and
major programs. To replace the Draft Presidential
Memorandums issued by McNamara were the Major Program Issues
identified by the Bureau. In response thereto, the various
departments were to prepare Program memoranda (PM) , the
civilian counterpart of the Defense Program Change Reguest
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(PCR) . Even the analyses supporting the Defense PCE were
given a civilian counterpart, Special Analytic Studies
(SAS) . Unfortunately, the similarities between military and
Civilian PPB were more cosmetic than real.
Despite the gallant efforts of seme agencies like the
Departments of Agriculture, Health, Education and Welfare
and the Office of Economic Opportunity, FFB was not long
lived. Although not abandoning PPB, the new Nixon
Administraticn of 1969 was to place a greater emphasis on
the analytic side of PFB than on the structural aspects (FFP
and program structure) . Decline in the number of Major
Program Issues from UOO in 1968 to 75 in 1969[41], was
further emphasis of the decreasing interest in ?P3 en the
part of top management .3y June 21, 1971, the demise of
federal civilian PPB was at nand with the annual Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-11 advising that
"Agencies are no longer required to submit
with their budget submissions the multiyear
program and financing plans, program
memoranda and special analytical studies ...
or the schedules ... that reconcile
information classified according to their
program and appropriation structures. "[42 ]
Despite the Circular's reaffirmation of "multiyear program
planning, analysis and evaluation", it had effectively
eliminated the very means by which analysis and budgeting
were to be interconnected. Without the linkage between the
two, analysis would be for its own sake.
For purposes of this paper however, the important issue
is not the actual demise of PPB but the reasons for its
demise. The differences between military and civilian FP3,
so substantial as to render one a success and the other a
failure, provide a meaningful context in which to search for
the underlying reasons. Accordingly what follows is first
of all an attempt to isolate the basic differences between
inplementaticn of military and civilian PPB and secondly an
explanation of the reasons for success in some civilian
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agencies tat failure in others.
1 • Differ ence s Between Military and Civilian PP3
The differences between military and civiliar. PP3
were of twc principle types, those pertaining tc the
environment and those pertaining to the manner in which
implemented. With regard to the former, the defense and
civilian program environments are first of all by nature
different. The degree to which either is susceptable tc to
guantitative analysis varies significantly. At least in
defense, program planning can be pursued in the context cf a
few ascertainable threats. For example, given the enemy's
development of deep penetrating nuclear warheads, programs
can be planned and pursued so as to offset any potential
military advantage. The effectiveness cf alternative
programs can be evaluated in terms of the threats to be met
cr such overall strategies as preparedness and deterrence.
Therefore certain criteria can be used as a basis for
choice. The same characteristics are not so easily found in
the civilian sector. As a general rule, the "threat" is not
so much the hardware oriented man-machine system
characteristic of Defense but instead a socio-eccncmic
problem that is much more nebulous and difficult to define.
Additionally, the inability to isolate the causes for social
and economic problems make their treatment even more
difficult. Take for example the rise in murder rates
nationwide vhich may te the result of either inadequate gun
control, unpremeditated crimes of passion cr the general
decline in education. The determination cf cause, however
difficult tc define, should be the basis upon which
corrective programs (capital punishment cr rehabilitation)
are chosen. Regardless of its non- susceptibility to easy
guantif icaticn, the need for more systematic analysis,
planning and budgeting is evident. That it did not cccur in
the civilian sector is attributable tc a second difference
between military and civilian PPB, that is, capability.
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Simply put, the planning a.nd analytical capabilities
of the Department of Defense were nearly non-existent in the
civilian bureaucracies. Indeed, implementation of PPE in
the Department of Defense had been preceded by efforts, to a
large extent sponsored by Defense, dating back to the
Production Reguirements Plan of 1941- By the time BcSamara
had arrived on the scene, analysis and planning, although
separate and distinct from budgeting, had beccae fairly well
institutionalized. The same was not true of the civilian
agencies. Net only were the personnel to conduct the
planning and analysis of PPB not present, but their
ncn-availability was to remain a significant weakness for
considerable time to come. Even the raw materials of
analysis and planning, that is time and data, were lacking
due to the always impending budget cycle and inadequate
information systems.
As if this was not enough to condemn civilian PPB,
there was a third difference. It was to be the economic
environment in which implemented. During the early 1960s,
PPB in Defense was assisted by the availability of new funds
to support additional strategic and conventional programs.
Eetween 1961 and 1963 the Defense budget grew by a little
over $8 billion (as compared to the 35 billion that an
incrementalist might expect) . Therefore, the pressure to
contest past decisions was substantially lessened. In
contrast, however, the civilian sector was to have no such
advantage. Instead, the rising costs of defense
particularly from the growing Vietnam war, Great Scciety
programs and inflation were to point towards greater
conflict in the civilian sector for which incrementalism had
in the past proven an adequate remedy. As compared to the
military resource question, the civilian issue was no longer
"...whose ox should be fattened but whose ox
should be gored. "[43]
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Unfortunately civilian PPB had not yet sufficiently matured
to the pcint of being able tc survive such issues.
Whether civilian EPB ever had a chance cf maturing when
confronted by the environmental problems outlined above is
somewhat academic. The more practical probletrs of
iirpleraentaticn were sufficient by themselves to render it
inoperable. The more significant of these problems,
particularly those relevant to the pursuit of zero-base
budgeting, are explored in the following paragraphs.
The first, and perhaps the most serious problem facing
civilian PPS, was the manner in which it was implemented.
From The very start, civilian PPB was at a disadvantage in
that its application had been directed rather than carefully-
nurtured. As previously mentioned, both President Johnson
and his 3udget Bureau were sufficiently enamoured with the
Defense process to require its implementation, with only
cosmetic changes, in civilian agencies that neither
understood its principles nor had participated in its
design. Faced with a new procedure that bore no resemblance
to the existing methodology and that was net adapted tc the
idicsyncracies of each agency, implementers were forced to
conclude that PPB was "just another requirement" to satisfy
the Bureau of the Budget. The agencies were not alone.
Even the Eureau itself had relegated the PPE function tc a
staff separate and distinct from the budget review and
examination operations. Such distinction was further
strengthened by the appearance of separate directives for
budgeting and PPB with little reference between the two.
The Bureau's guidance to
"...establish an adequate central staff or
staffs for analysis, planning anc
programming"
coupled with lack cf preparation, inadequate understanding
cf what was tc be accocplished and the Bureau's own example,
was sufficient to exempt agency budget decisions from the
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intended influence of EPB.
Top management support and leadership were lacking in
ether regards as well. One of the primary purposes of PPB
as developed in Defense was to facilitate decision making on
a program basis without regard to organizational boundaries,
lo this end McNamara and his compatriots played a central
role in assuring the development of a cross service program
structure. The same degree of central participation and
leadership was not evident in the civilian PPB experience.
Instead program structures were developed independen tlj with
little Bureau coordination or involvement.. Thus a primary
objective of PPB was to remain unfulfilled from the very
start. For those who were led to believe that PPB was to
support the information needs of the Bureau, this weakness
was particularly distressing.
2 • ieasens Underlyi ng the Limi ted Success of Civilian
Hi
The weaknesses outlined above were net the onlv cnes
to plague PPE in the civilian sector. Others including
inadeguately developed output and impact measures,
intra-organizational political (non-partisan) struggles and
inadeguate consideration of Congressional requirements were
but a few of the ethers contributing tc its d€mise.
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, PPB did have some limited
success as is reported in a mid-1968 study conducted b\ the
Eureau of the 3udget. The study summarized in an article
written by Edwin Harper, Fred Kramer and Andrew Rouse for
public Administraticn R evi ew, found six factors
characterizing these departments which experienced some
success with PPB. (44) The characteristics of these
departments (Agriculture, Health, education and weifar€ and
the Office cf Economic Opportunity) tend tc emphasize the
need to deal directly with the difficulties referred to in
the previcus section and include
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-an adequate number of analysts
-well qualified analysts
-vertical and horizontal linkage tc decision
makers and the budget staff respectively
-analysis was supported by
relationships
informal
-tcp management support and use cf analysis
-an attitude that PPB was of benefit to the
department/agency as well as the Bureau of
the Budget
Subsequent reform efforts, namely that of zerc-base
budgeting, might be substantially enhanced by due
consider aticr of these characteristics.
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E. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING - A CONCLUSION
For the most part EPB failed in the civilian bureaucracy
and is perhaps not as strong as it might be in the military
sector if planning improvements were made. Notwithstanding
its weaknesses, PPB has left a legacy of analytic resources
and a growing executive and legislative awareness cf the
need to use such resources. In looking ahead to the next
era cf budget reform, Allen Shick once said
"With so much of the business of PPE undone.
it is probable that under a different label
and with somewhat different approaches and
techniques there eventually will be a return
to the aims of PPB. "[45]
With a slightly different approach but certainly many cf the




In the preceding chapters the author has dealt almcst
exclusively with the history of budget reform and mere
specifically with the products of the reform movement - line
item budgeting, performance budgeting and Plaining,
Programming and Budgeting (PPB) . The objective cf the
foregoing has been to identify the characteristics cf each
product and the political, social and economic reasons,
underlying its success or failure. By so doing, perhaps the
mistakes and environmental threats cf the past can be
avoided by the current attempts to implement zerc-base
budgeting
.
Recognition, however, of the reasons fcr success or
failure in past reform efforts is but half the key to
successful i aplementation of zero-base budgeting ir the
federal sectcr. The other half will be the deliberate
adaptation of new budget reform proposals tc the existing
environment. A necessary prerequisite fcr such action is an
understanding of the latest reform proposal, zerc-base
budgeting, and its variations as reflected in private and
state applications. By portraying zerc-base budgeting as a
systematic decision making mcdel, this Chapter seeks to
provide the necessary understanding and, in conceptual
terms, to demonstrate the close resemblance of zerc-fcase
budgeting tc PPB. The following Chapter will then examine a





Zero-base budgeting is best set in perspective by
envisioning a spectrum of budget techniques. At one end is
the incremental approach, that which is most commonly used




At the opposite end of this spectrum lies the Zerc-rase
methodology, increasingly being adopted by state and federal
agencies as well as in the private sector. EFES,
persistently groping for a higher degree of
comprehensiveness, lies close to the zero-base methodology.
Instead of concentrating on additions or deletions to
the existing budget as in the incremental case, zerc-tase
budgeting refers to a highly structured and systematic
justification of all expenditures, current as well as
proposed. Zero-base budgeting is structured in the sense
that relevant information is deliberately channeled to the
decision maker and is systematic in the sense that for each
expenditure, objectives are specified, alternatives
designed, costs and benefits identified, assumptions
guestioned and new alternatives and objectives considered.
As a structured and systematic technique, zerc-base
budgeting concentrates on the contribution toward an
activity's objectives derived from each initial and each
additional unit of expenditure, doing so through a series of
marginal analyses.
All of the above is accomplished in three basic steps -
first, identifying decision units, secondly, developing a
number of alternatives called decision packages and thirdly,
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ranking those decision packages. A decision unit is in
effect an economic representation of a discrete operation
that can te either eliminated, reduced, allowed to remain as
is or be expanded. Each of these options is supported ty a
decision package, i.e., an economic analysis of each
option's impact on the organization. Ey ranking these
decision packages, the activity develops a plan for optimum
resource allocation within a given fiscal constraint. Each
of these steps will be examined aore closely in the text
that follows.
£. IHE EEOCISS
Perhaps the first and most important step in developing
a zero-base budget is identifying the objectives acainst
which costs and benefits of various alternatives are to be
measured. Albeit the most important, it is unfortunately
the most overlooked aspect of government management today.
By forcing lower levels of management to specify their goals
in guantitative, output terms and to describe the
contribution of such output to organizational goals,
zero-base budgeting calls attention to the need for adequate
planning and simultaneously provides the technical basis on
which such planning can be developed. It does so by
describing existing production functions (the ways in which
capital and labor, or other factors, are converted to
output) and facilitates a complete understanding of the
limitations under which such production functions operate.
Zero-base budgeting can be considered net only a tccl of
sub-optimization (by telling one how best to achieve a
desired result, as will be explained later) but also of
total optimization (by providing a rational basis on which
to eliminate, reduce or expand a given goal). [46] Ir. this
respect, zero-base budgeting closely resembles the
circularity of systematic aralysis[47] i.e., specification
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of objectives/ statement of alternatives, identification and
comparison of costs and benefits, questioning of assumptions
and objectives and repetition of the process until the
optimum solution is found.
Assuming that an adequate planning process has evolved
from which objectives and planning assumptions are
promulgated, lower management levels begin the process of
identifying alternative means of achieving those objectives.
Toward this end, management's next step, and perhaps the
most difficult one, is to separate all of its operations
into discrete decision units. Such decision units may be
programs, organizations, activities, functions or any entity
having an output and over which management has discretion.
When documented, the decision unit becomes an economic
representation of a discrete operation susceptible to
manipulation by management. The decision unit is
identified, and its documentation ideally prepared at the
lowest levels of management for the purpose of providing to
higher levels a series of economic analyses reflecting each
unit's (current as well as proposed) contributions to
organizational objectives at various levels of expenditure.
Once discrete decision units have been identified, the
manager must consider and document alternative means and
levels for accomplishing that discrete unit's mission. Each
documented alternative is a decision package and certains






6. Measures of performance
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7. Impact cf not performing
Each of these, a common element in most economic analyses,
is illustrated by the sample decision packages in Figures
(5) , (6) and (7) , which taken together comprise a decision
unit. It is this consideration of documented decision
package alternatives, ideally at the lowest management
levels, that is the key to zero-case budgeting and alsc the
characteristic that differentiates it from ether budgetary
techniques. The basic goal is to provide higher levels of
management with a substantial number cf choices and the
necessary information with which to make these choices. To
do this, the decision unit's manager must examine two basic
types of alternatives -
first, different means of achieving the
decision unit's objective, and
secend, different levels of effort for that
objective.
The first type cf alternative requires the manager to
consciously construct what might be considered a production
function for a given objective. Such a function is in
essence a representation of how differing resources
(capital, labor, contract support, etc) can be combined -co
produce a desired level of output or ctjective. In
zero-base budgeting, management picks the least costly
combination (while documenting the ethers) for a given
objective as the basis for consideration cf the second set
of alternatives, namely multiple levels of effort.
Faced with limited resources, consideration of enly one
level of effcrt presents higher management with restricted
options, that is, either eliminating the function or funding
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the marginal nature of most service and support activities
by explicitly identifying alternative levels of performance
for each decision unit objective. It is net so much a
question cf either Unit A or Unit B but rather how much more
of A at the expense of B {or vice versa) . To this end,
zero-base budgeting requires that decision units be
subdivided into incremental levels of effort, i.e., decision
packages. lhat is to say, Unit A includes a separate
evaluaticn/package for a minimum level cf effort (below
which it is not feasible or realistic to operate) including
a statement cf the consequences cf not performing at all, a
current level of effort and an enhanced level of effort. By
so dcing management at all levels of the organization can
view each ircrement of effort as a separate requirement for
resources competing with all ether activity increnents.
from a macrc point of view, such individual increments
become the means of accomplishing organizational objectives,
i.e., the factors tc be optimized in the tctal production
function fcr the organization.
The advantage of having documented alternative
performance levels becomes particularly apparent when
locking at the costs and benefits associated with each
level. Zerc-tase budgeting requires that net only all costs
and benefits (stated as dollar savings cr output) be
identified fcr each decision package but that such costs and
benefits be portrayed in marginal terms, i.e., arisinc from
each additicnal increment of expenditure. The question now
can be stated as not "how much more of A at the expense of
E?" but rather by comparing marginal costs and benefits,
"shculd an increment cf A be added-?" and "dees an increment
cf A contribute more tc the activity's objectives than an
increment of B?.'* The choice might be relatively simple if
all benefits were stated in commensurable terms. The fact
that they are not however, does not negate the need for
systematic analysis. It in fact increases the need to
systematically present the decision maker with choices upon
84

which his experience and judgement can be biccght to tear.
This becomes most apparent in the prccess of ranking
decision packages.
C. RANKING 1HE ALTERNATIVES
At this point in the zero-base budgeting process,
managers at the lowest appropriate organizational level have
identified in discrete terms all those activities that may
be performed to achieve the assigned objectives. Such
activities have been documented in terms of the best (and
alternative) means of accomplishing the objective and
alternative levels of performance, including marginal ccsts
and benefits associated with each level. Each documented
level of performance becomes susceptible tc ranking ry the
decision maker, beginning at the lowest levels of the
organization with successive consolidation and ranking at
each higher level. For example, visualize that during the
first stage of zero-base budgeting, Cost Center A of a
governmeot agency developed the alternative performance
levels portrayed in Figures (5) , (6) and (7) . Visualize
also for example that two other Cost Centers, B and C, also
developed similar decision packages. The array of







DP A1 Minimum Level
DP A2 Current Level
DP A3 Enhanced Level
Cost Center B:
EP E1 Minimum Level
E? E2 Current Level
DP E3 Enhanced Level
Cost Center C:
EP C1 Minimum Level
EP C2 Current Level
DP C3 Enhanced Level
Priority
After ranking at the next higher level of management, the





DP A1 Minimum Level
DP C1 Minimum Level
DP A2 Current level
DP C2 Current level
DP C3 Enhanced Level
DP B1 Minimum level
DP B2 Current level
DP A3 Enhanced Level
DP B3 Enhanced Level
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In prioritizing each potential resource allocation, the
decision maker (in this case a division head) must start
with the marginal contribution that each alternative makes
toward accomplishing the division's objectives.
Unfortunately the contributions arising from each
alternative are not all stated in dollar terms, particularly
in the public sector where such contributions may be
guantities of services provided or some other form of
output. Such noncommensurability makes the prioritization
process mere difficult and requires that maximum use be made
of management's background skills and judgement. The
ranking process outlined above is repeated at each higher
level of the organization through consolidation and revision
cf rankings submitted by subordinate levels. The final
result, a prioritized listing cf performance alternatives
for the entire organization, represents a plan for optimal
allocation of resources in whatever amount appropriated. It
is optimal in the sense that for each added increment of
resources, an alternative with the greatest marginal benefit
is to be funded.
As may be readily concluded from the arcve, considerable
managerial resources would be required to rank each
alternative level of effort particularly when considering
the size of most federal agencies as well as the tctal
federal budget. Techniques have been developed to reduce
this drain on managerial talent. [48] For example:
-the manager is not so much concerned with
comparing the priority of package 14 with
package 15, but is concerned more with the
relative contributions of packages 4 and 5 as
opposed to packages 20 and 21, or
-a cut-off level is established at each
organizational level with ranking of only
these alternatives below that level beinc
accomplished. So as to limit the number of
packages being ranked at each higher level,




A further alternative might be the application cf linear
programming techniques as described in the following
paragraph.
In those cases where costs and benefits of an added
increment of effort can be stated in dollar terms, there is
little difficulty in judging the contributicn made. When
the benefits to be gained are not stated in dollar terms,
the value relative to the dollar benefits of ether
alternatives is very difficult to judge. When comparing a
myriad cf noncommensurable alternatives, the difficulties
can well be appreciated. However, if the relative
preferences of management at the agency level cculd be
expressed by weighting one type of benefit in terms of
another, an objective function for that agency might be
constructed during the planning process. [49 1 Such a scheme
might be based on the relative weights giver to programs,
functions or activities in previous budgets. Ideally,
through linear programming techniques, such an objective
function could be maximized by optimally ranking varicus
cembinatiens of weighted performance level contributions
subject to various resource (dollar and people) and/or
administrative (travel, public v. private maintenance, etc.)
constraints. Such an approach if developed further might
substantially reduce the expenditure of austere management
resources en the mechanics cf ranking and instead allow
greater management emphasis en the review and unavoidable
adjustment of computer produced rankings. This process
would also assure the manager that consistent criteria had
been applied to all alternative choices. The last but not
least benefit of such an approach would be the creation cf a
decision model wherein the impact of changing preferences
and constraints on resource allocation cculd be quickly
evaluated. While the benefits from such an approach appear
substantial, all the advantages cf zero-base budgeting would
be lost if management relinquishes its responsibility to
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review and override the computer's ranking when necessary,
enviously the approach outlined above greatly ever
simplifies the problem of noncommensur ables as well as many
others including, for example, the interdependences of
federal programs. It nevertheless offers considerable
potential for enhancing the zero-base budgeting process.
D. COMPARISON OF PPE WITH ZERO-BASE BUDGETING
Prior to concluding this chapter, a very trief comparison
of zero-base budgeting with the Planning, Programmirg and
Eudgeting System may be worthwhile. In theory, PPBS closely
resembles zero-base budgeting. Both are designed to
accomplish the same goal, i.e., to facilitate optimal
allocation of resources by the use of systematic analysis in
the resource allocation process. In practice there ar€ seme
distinct differences. First, in PPBS the systematic
development and examination of alternatives occurs
predominantly at top levels of management with lower
echelons completing the many and various budget back-up
displays to support top management's decisions. Although
top management has made its basic planning and program
decisions, there are still many policy choices and
alternatives that need to be considered in tudget
preparation and execution. Zero-base budgeting recccnizes
that those best able to initially develop and analyze these
choices and alternatives are at the lower organizational
levels. Ihrcugh its decision packages and ranking process,
zero-base budgeting provides a systematic bottom-up analysis
and arrangement of choices based on the top-down planning
decisions.
Secondly, PPBS has focused analytical effort on specific
issues. Zero-base budgeting would require, in its decision
packages, analysis of all expenditures. Although in theory
designed to be as comprehensive as zero-base budgeting, PPBS
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has never attained this objective due tc a lack of
analytical resources, including personnel and the necessary
information rase. Zero-base budgeting provides a solution
tc this problem by, first, giving lower levels of management
a primary role in the analytical effort (thus increasing the
number cf "players") and secondly, by means of its decision
packages, increasing the quantity and quality of
informaticn.
Thirdly, PPBS does not provide for an explicit ranking
cf alternatives or levels of effort. As a consequence, the
manager is unable to assure himself that resources have been
or are being optimally allocated. For example, it is not
uncommon for an agency to absorb a percentage reduction in
its funds fcy applying that percentage as a horizontal
reduction to all activities performed. Zero-base budgeting,
by means of its priority ranked listings of alternative
performance levels, allows the manager tc select these
levels cf performance considered the least important for
eiimina lion/reduction. Resource allocation therefore





This chapter has attempted to pcrtray zerc-tase
tudgeting net in terms of the nechanics ty which it is
accomplished but as a systematic decision making model. In
effect it extends systematic analysis beyond the planning
and programming phases to the budget preparation process and
in so doing complements, in fact enhances, the existing, FFBS
approach. While this chapter has. perhaps somewhat ever
simplified the mechanics and problems inherent to zerc-tase
budgeting, its purpose will have been fulfilled if the
reader more fully recognizes the potential of zerc-tase
budgeting for better public sector resource allocation.
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V. APPLICATIONS OF ZERO-EASE ECDGETING
A. INTECEUCTION
Zero-base budgeting, as defined and modelled in the
preceding Chapter, was first used on an experimental basis
in 1969 by Texas Instruments Inc. to evaluate the operating
expenses of certain staff and research divisions.
Considered a success, the new methodology was applied to all
divisions of Texas Instruments in the fall of 1S70 and is
still in use today. From the Texas Instruments experience,
the zero-base budgeting concept was to expand not crly to
ether firms of the private sector but also to state
government.
Following his election in November 1970 as Governor of
Georgia, Jimmy Carter was to be frustrated in his search for
comprehensive information about the costs and benefits of
state programs. While searching for a mere informative
resource allocation process, Governor Carter was to read of
the Texas Instruments' methodology, and shortly thereafter
announce implementation of the same for development of
Georgia's F^ 1973 budget. From Georgia zero-base budgeting
was to be adopted by eleven (as of August 1976) other states
and eventually, with Carter's election in November 1S76 to
the U. S. Presidency, by the federal bureaucracy.
Today zero-base budgeting has beccie part of the
planning and control procedures of a wide variety of
commercial and governmental institutions. In adapting to
these organizations, varying approaches to zero-base
budgeting have evolved. Typical of these varying approaches
are the innovations described in the following paragraphs.
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The purpcse of this Chapter is not to provide an exhaustive
listing of options but instead to describe, through brief
case examples, methods of inplementation
,
particularly
innovative techniques and some of the lessens learned in
fairly successful commercial and governmental applications.
E. PRIVATE SECTOR APPLICATIONS
In the following paragraphs, the authcr will briefly
examine the various zero-base budgeting methodologies used
in a few of the companies that have implemented the process.
Eicked en the basis of their diversity, it is the author's
intent re illustrate varying approaches to implementation,
definition and use of decision units and packages and
varying ranking methodologies that have proven successful.
The basic concepts in use at any of the companies to be
examined, however, closely resemble the model defined in the
previous Chapter. Consequently in what fellows, only the
unique variations to that model will be illustrated.
1 • Zero-base Budgeting at Tex as Instruments Inc^
Prom an implementation standpoint, zerc*-base
budgeting in Texas Instruments Inc. (TI) did net cccur
overnight as one is led to believe by the existing
literature. Instead implementation at II was a gradual
process cf conceptual development dating back to 1962. [50]
In fact most of the elements of the process - decision
units, packages and ranking - were developed as part cf TI's
Objectives, Strategies and Tactics (OSI) system. Under that
system, the need arose for evaluating and trading off
strategic expenses, that is proposed projects for research
and product/process development projects. Tc satisfy this
need, the use cf decision packages was begun in 1966. Along
with the use of decision packages came recognition cf the
need for pricritizing and ranking and censequently the
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appearance of criteria and methodology for that rarking.
Systematic ranking, first accomplished b$ TI's Equipment
Group in planning for 1967 and 1968, was further refined and
used across TI in planning for 1969. It was not until 1969
that TI's Chairman of the Board and President both expressed
the need for a means of trading off operating expenses
against strategic expenses. With such impetus, zero-base
budgeting as known today was born. The most important
aspect of the foregoing is recognition of the fact that
zero-base budgeting did net "just happen" at TI. Ir many
respects the development of zero-base budgeting in TI was
net too different from development of PPBS in the Department
of Defense. Eoth were designed to facilitate trace-eff
analysis and both were designed internally to meet
management's needs vice being imposed from external sources.
The zero-base budgeting methodology developed by TI
consists cf four basic steps.
-First, setting preliminary expense targets
for the period oeing budgeted.
-Second, defining and developing "decision
packages ."
-Third, selecting through ranking,
cost-benefit and trade-off analysis the most
desirable packages.
-Fourth, setting the budget as the sum of
those "decision packages" approved.
With regard to the first of these, TI has found that
the setting cf preliminary expense targets serves to make
the entire process more efficient. Although reminiscent of
Lewis' comments relative to deciding the merits of the case
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before the evidence is in, these preliminary expense targets
serve seme very practical purposes. The targets, products
of business models using such factors as projected net sales
and gross prcfit margins, focus decision package development
efforts liithic the boundaries of expected funding. Serving
as a guideline, not a firm ceiling, these targets have
served to eliminate the expenditure of time and effort in
developing packages which have a very lew probability of
being funded. Additionally the use of targets mitigate
against the development of "shopping lists" and forces hard
decisions frcm the very beginning of the process.
With respect to the second step indicated above,
defining and developing decision packages, II has developed
not one but four approaches. Prior to examination of these
four approaches it is important to recognize that ir. TI,
zerc-bas€ budgeting is applied to service and support areas.
It is net applied to -chose manufacturing operations which
are volume dependent, volatile operation and where
fixed/variable budgeting methodologies are mere appropriate.
Within the service and support area, operating expenses are
analyzed according to four techniques depending on the type
of expense. The first of these techniques, the Operating
Decision Eackage (CDP) , is much like chat defined ir. the
previous Chapter. In II, it is used to depict in analytical
terms specific task activities including projects and
programs which are to be operated at a discrete level for a
specific period to achieve a specific goal. An example of
an Operating Decision Eackage[51] is provided in Figure (8).
The second technique, depicted in Figure (9) , is the Level
of Effort (LOE) technique. It is similar in concept to the
Operating Decision Package but is applied in those service
and support areas where operations are more routine and are
either operationally or legally required to support an
cn-going business. Examples in which the LCE technique is
useful include payroll, legal services, maintenance,












u 3 .|» c
oe a
c >fc- >•.















. ? 5 a
x-o c £




a. • «- «"" » <J


































J2 c c to O
a.















































o >o se a5 #
t»» * cat o»o^
" •• rv
<N r» # # #
r«. • o« o oo
** tN <x>
r*. <N 3« ^
#




















a *"" wT «
-8 • >
£ ~ s
.2 o o J
S = • x
§ • > »
i- S o 5 -
— kS > -=C i—3X Mi «* *fW S v*- «
_3 £ 9r S
CL ~ x -O
•S 5 • %
8 -5 J Jc -o .^r
O = -5- C
§ § • y
2 S'5 "£
e- a-ts-2





w S o o c
*" 5 2 • <
if j i
i
3 5 — y
-H "-sj
^5. ^ 2 -j
~ 2 2 »2
<4 oil-
!S O f ^~
ca>
> s * - 2














































11 ? «N ev
























Figure 8 - OPERATING DECISION PACKAGE
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LEVEL OF EFFORT ANALYSIS tm.*.» •
FUNCTION
PCC A8C Production Planning
'
LEVELS *
ACTIVITY/TASK i 2 3* 4 5
Compile Demand
Customer interface F D c C 8
International Inputs C B B B A
Dallas Inputs C C C C 3
Derive Stocking Levels D D D m B
Operating Planning
Line Balancing D C C B A
Demand Balancing D c ? A A
Work Scheduling F D k C B
Photomask Operations F D C c B
Forecasting
Bar Billings F F D D c
Mask Requirements D D D C 3
Materials D C C C c
Excess Bar Inventory Control F c « A A
lonq Ranee Planning
Capacity & Equipment planning F D D c C
Caoitcl Investment Planning F F F D C
Market Protections S> Interpretations F F D D c
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Figure 9 - LEV I.L 01 EFFOST ANALYSIS
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effectively applied by categorizing the eftcrts within an
expense aiea into broad tasks and functions and within which
detailed work activities are listed. The guaiity achieved
in each of these work activities is subjectively prelected
at alternative levels of effort and is guantitatively
represented by the resources necessary to attain each level.
Level 1 is the lowest level of effort, below which it is not
feasible to operate, and level five is the highest realistic
level of effcrt. While similar in concept tc the Operating
Decision Package, it is much less detailed and certainly
mere subjective.
The third and fourth techniques are conceptually
different in that they involve mere of a validation cf ccsts
vice an explicit consideration cf alternative spending
levels. The third, the Expense Matrix Analysis, is best
used at any level cf the organization where subordinate
units use a consistent set of cost elements and performance
indices. As illustrated in Figure (10)/ by comparing
various cost elements (say as a percentage of net sales
billable) across subcrganizaticnal units with the same
objectives, the manager can assure himself cf the relative
validity of budgeted costs. The fourth technique is a
variation of the third. The techniques for analyzing
service and support ccsts are certainly net limited tc the
fcregoing. Perhaps mest importantly, the reader should
reccgnize that there are many ways of organizing "decision
packages", limited only tc the characteristics (goal
oriented, routine , etc
.) of the cost and the imagination of
the responsible manager.
With regard to TI * s third majcr prccess step, two
techniques cf ranking are identified depending cr the
manager's pesitien in the organization. Packages are
initially ranked at the level of the organization where they
are developed, thus giving the process the motivational
advantages which accrue from s participatory management
approacn. At this level the ranking is accomplished bj the
98

Marketing A Marketing B Marketing C Marketing D Total
% of NSB
1971 1972 1971 1972 1971 1972 1971 1972 1971 1972
Manager Wages 15.9 10.2 19.5 20.0 _ 10.8 8.7
Supervisor Wages 1Q.0 6.6 20.7 15.7 12.7 13.3 23.0 16.1 15.3 11.7
Support Wages 7.5 5.1 12.8 10.2 14.6 17.1 6.6 4.8 T0.5 3.6
Rent 2.5 1.6 2.6 1.8 2.0 1.9 5.0 3.2 2.8 2.0
Telephone 5.9 4.1 3.9 2.8 2.9 3.8 5.0 3.2 4.4 3.6
Office 4.6 2.8 3.2 2.3 4.9 4.8 4.1 2.8 4.3 3.1
Travel 5.4 3.6 2.6 1.3 2.0 2.9 3.3 2.1 3.5 2.8
HLV 1.7 1.3 2.6 1.8 2.0 2.4 3.3 2.1 2.2 ^.8
Courtesy 2.7 1.8 3.2 2.3 1.Q 1.4 1.6 1.1 2.1 1.7
Employee Benefits 15.1 9.7 9.7 7.4 10.7 11.4 19.7 12.8 13.5 10.1
Other Benefits 1.5 1.0 3.9 3.2 4.5 4.8 21.0 1.6 3.0 2.4
Depreciation 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Total % of NSB 73.0 48 66 50 77 84 47 50 72 56
NSB 119.6 196.3 77.4 108.7 102.4 105.0 60.8 93.4 360.2 502.9
Avg People — Exempt 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 6 6
Nonexempt 2 2 3 3 3 4 1 1 9 1
Figure 10 - EXPENSE tfAIRIX ANALYSIS
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individual who has the necessary expertise tc do so. is the
packages mcve upward through the organizational hierarchy,
this individual expertise becomes mere scarce and is
replaced by reliance upon committee judgement. Within the
committee, each package is ranked on the basis of weighted
criteria as depicted in Figure (11). Through this ranking
process, initially by the individual and subsequently by
committee, both operating and strategic expenses are
separately prioritized. After the prioritized list is
developed, the level of allowable funding is finally decided
upon for both operating and strategic expense and separate
cut-off lines are appropriately drawn. As a final check,
management exercises its judgement with respect to those
packages falling immediately above and below the cut-off
lines. Ey so ding TI management is able tc assure itself
that priority ranking was accomplished properly and that
obviously required packages were not intentionally or
unintentionally given too low a priority.
2 • Zer o-bas e Budgeting at Sout her n California Edison
Company
Zero-base Cperational Planning and Eudgeting, as the
new methodology is called at Southern California Edison
(SCE) [52], had its genesis from two related factors. First
was the rising ccsts of energy and the simultaneously
declining growth rate in energy sales. Particularly
troublesome trends in a utility company, SCE had reached the
point where, in preparing its 1974 budget, projected
earnings would not meet the established company objectives.
Through considerable effort expenses were reduced tc meet
arbitrarily specified spending limits. While top management
review of the impact of such reductions provided visibility
as to what was not going tc be accomplished, no such
visibility was available as to what was going to be dene in
1974. Such conditions prompted SCE's Budget Director and
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provide the required visibility and the necessary
flexibility to meet the changing energy environment. The
second factor underlying the genesis of SCE's Zero-base
Operational Planning and Eudgeting system was the emergence
of such a technigue in Texas Instruments (as documented by
Peter Pyhrr) .[53]
Just as in Texas Instruments, SCE uas to implement
the zero-base methodology on a gradual basis. In this
regard the entire process was completely tested in six staff
departments while parts of the process were tested in the
ether regaining departments. Although limited in
application, the test was useful in
-identifying factors which inhibited
immediate acceptance by various managers.
-providing an opportunity to "sell" managers
on the usefulness of the concept.
-converting the "numbers oriented", clerical
budget process to a line oriented management
tool.
-shifting responsibility for budget
reductions from the staff to the responsible
managers who were best able to assess the
impact of such reductions.
Perhaps the acst significant outcome of these initial tests
was the identification and consequent devoticn of
considerable energies to the human factors of system
implementation. During the initial test, indications were
that the process had not been tailored to management's
peculiar styles and interests, that training was inadeguate
but of key inportance and that instructions and illustrative
examples were not sufficient. Furthermore, and most
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importantly, considerable "salesmanship" was found to be
required. Paced with additional information requirements
and associated efforts, middle and lower management were to
require considerable persuasion that the new process offered
benefits that outweighed the costs. Such benefits were to
include an escape from the traditional across the board
spending reductions, a chance to participate in the decision
making process and an explicit performance contract with
one's superior concerning the work to be accomplished and
the resources to be provided for its accomplishment. Not
only must middle and lower management levels be convinced
that such benefits are available, bur top manage nent's
actions must also demonstrate support and use of the system.
For 1975 and 1976 the Zero-base Operational Planning
and Eudgeting methodology was expanded with new managers
being brought under the process. The lessens learned during
this period were significant and can be useful in
implementing zero-base budgeting in the federal sector.
These lessons include the following:
-Zero-base Operational Planning and
Budgeting's success was determined by the
extent to which considered useful and
rewarding to middle managers.
-Eudaet guidance was determined to be
insufficient in terms of the mechanics and
excessive in terms of the philosophy.
-The most significant benefits arc use of
SCE's methodology was at the lower and middle
management levels where it could serve as a
working guide throughout the year.
-Packages prepared in 1975 could be re-used




-Because benefits in many cases are net
quantifiable, judgements pertaining to their
should be accompanied by a risk assessment.
-Because of the increased visibility, many
current as well as proposed packages were
scaled down before submission to reviewinc
levels of management.
-Guidance encouraged the submission of
increased level cf effort proposals if
substantial cost savings or benerits could be
demonstrated. Most of these, which would
have never been submitted under the old
system, were approved under the current
methodology
.
With respect to the actual mechanics cf SCE's prccess,
it is net much different frcm that used by Texas
Instruments. The definiticn cf decision packages in SCE
closely resembles that of TI's Operational Cecision Eackage.
However, with regard to ranking procedures, SCE uses a
technigue tc minimize the number of packages to which
management must devote its attention. At the lowest level
of budgeting, the manager ranks all decision packages just
as before. At subsequently higher levels the manager
establishes arbitrary cut-off levels, say sixty percent of
the upcoming budget, for that particular organizational
subdivisicn. For example at the Departmental level, only
those packages ranked below the 60% cut-off by each
subordinate cost center would be reviewed and ranked in
detail by the department manager. For those packages which
the cost center had ranked above the sixty percent cut-eff,
the departnent manager would give only a cursory review to
ensure appropriateness and adequate consideration of
alternatives. At each higher level of the organization, the
percentage cut-off is increased so as tc minimize the number
cf packages subject to detailed review.
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3- Zero-base Budget ing at ii es t in cj house Iljctric
Corporation
In concept and philosophy, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation^ (WEC) application differs little from that of
Texas Instruments and Southern California Edison. Ir its
application of zero-tase budgeting, Zero Base Plannirg and
£udgeting[ 54 ], WEC has made explicit three considerations in
determining a meaningful organizational level at which
decision units are best developed. The first is the size of
the operational and organizational level ax which meaningful
decisions car be made. In this respect decision units that
might include fractions of people are tec small since one
cannot make a trade-off decision involving, for example, one
tenth of a person. Neither can a decision, however, be made
en an entire legal staff of 50 people who, in various
subcomponents, provide different services. As a -means of
defining decision units, WEC suggests the use of an
organization chart. The lowest level cost centers indicated
thereon are perhaps the starting point since originally
established for the control and management of specific
activities.
The second consideration set forth by WEC is the
degree of discretion available in making decisions.
Government regulations, legal requirements and existing
commitments may significantly reduce the number of
alternatives available. If, as a result, there is only one
"mandatory" alternative, it should be reflected in a single
decision package, given a high priority, and thereby quickly
relegated to higher levels for disposal as appropriate.
The third consideration is that of time available to
develop and rank decision packages at successive levels of
an organization. Because of the time constraints as well as
the size of the organization and experience of those
managers involved, it may be necessary to limit the
application cf zero-base budgeting at least when initially
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installed. Subsequently as managers become more accustomed
to the process, the depth to which applied can be expanded.
As a part of the definition and development of
decision units and packages, WEC also emphasizes the need
for non-financial workload and performance measures and in
so doing, the importance of adequate management analyst
assistance. The identification of appropriate performance
and workload measures is the responsibility cf the decision
unit manager whose subsequent performance will be monitored
accordingly. The adopted performance and workload measures
are in effect the quantitative and qualitative means by
which the relative contributions of each incremental package
is evaluated. Without such measures no trade-off analysis
can be objectively accomplished and zero-base budgeting will
have lost a substantial reascn for existence.
** • Zero-base Budgeting at Xerox Corporation
Confronted by a nationwide decline in the growth of
labcr productivity, the marginal success of existing
personnel activities and an increasing number of activities
from which to choose, Xerox was prompted to seek a
systematic way of assuring the allocation of scarce
resources tc these personnel programs offering the greatest
return. [55 J First used in 1971 in development cf the
company's long range manpower strategy and by 1973 used in
the development cf personnel unit operating budgets, the
Xerox methodology is similar to that cf the companies
previously described but also includes seme significant
innovations.
As in the case of Texas Instruments, Southern
California Edison, and the Westinghouse Ccrporaticn, the
first step of the Xerox process is the identification of
each current as well as proposed personnel program as a
discrete decison unit. Also as in the case cf the
previously described companies, those programs legally
required, such as affirmative action or occupational safety
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programs, are given the highest priority and thereby
segregated from the more discretionary activities. The
innovative aspects of the Xerox process are found not in the
structure of the process so much as in the analysis tc which
each program is subjected. Using standard criteria, each
program is evaluated in a range from high tc low feasibility
with respect to required and available state of the art,
iiplementation ease and economic benefits. Included as part
of the assessment of economic benefits is a cost-benefit
analysis making use of probabilistic techniques in
determining expected costs, expected benefits and net
expected cost or benefit. Furthermore, the economic risk of
net performing the package is assessed on a scale of from
high to low based en criteria established by top management
at Xerox. Subsequently all cf the above assessments are
used as input tc a decision table that classifies each
program as either very, moderately, marginally or not
desirable
.
As described above, the Xerox zerc-base budgeting
methcdolcgy provides a disciplined and systematic approach
to evaluating and ranking staff functions, in this case,
personnel. Perhaps its most novel aspects, the use of
probabilistic techniques and decision tables, may prcve
especially useful fcr other staff activities, which like
personnel, have costs and benefits that have prcven
difficult tc quantify in deterministic form.
5 . Summary, cf C om mercial Ap plications
The foregoing review cf four fairly successful
commercial applications is, as indicated earlier, not
intended to be exhaustive. In addition tc the four large
firms cited, ether firms such as Standard Cil Company (Mew
Jersey) , New York Telephone Company, Rockwell International,
Eaton Yale Ltd., Fibreboard Corporation, and Florida Power
and Light have made substantial efforts toward
iiplementation and, in so doing, have contributed tc the
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state of the art. The success of all such companies,
regardless cf their diversity, and particularly the four
mentioned above, can be attributed to certain common
characteristics. The most significant can be listed as
follows:
-pre-existence of an adequate planninc
process.
-considerable top management involvement and
support.
-imaginative adaptation of zero-base
budgeting concepts to management styles and
needs.
-substantial consideration of the human
aspects surrounding the system's acceptance.
While perhaps somewhat general, recognition of the above
characteristics and their embodiment in future zerc-tase
budgeting applications will do much toward increasing the
probability cf success.
C. STATE GOVERNMENT AMPLICATIONS
Perhaps even more applicable to the pursuit of zero-base
budgeting in the federal sector are the implementation
problems, the solutions tendered and the lessons learned in
state government applications. Certainly the implementation
of zero-base budgeting in the private sector of the economy
was not without its difficulties and challenges.
Application however cf the concept to state government,
while borrowing heavily from the experience cf private firms




Full appreciation of the difficulties and challenges
faced by state governments, and to a mere considerable
degree by the federal government, can be obtained by
examining both the similarities and differences between
public and private budgeting. In both cases, public and
private, the budget serves as a mechanism fcr establishing
objectives and goals, identifying the weaknesses to be
overcome and as a means of integrating and controlling
organizational performance. Unfortunately the similarities
extend net much further and the dissimilarities become mere
noticeable. The differences between the private and public
resource allocation process are sufficiently numerous to
fill an entire book, an effort that is well beyond the
intent and scope of this paper. A few of these differences,
however, are particularly germane to the pursuit of
zero-base budgeting and are sufficiently troublesome to
warrant mention in the following paragraphs.
First of these differences is the relative magnitude and
complexity of the allocation processes. Initially tried at
Texas Instruments, for example, zero-base budgeting was
applied to a staff and research budget of about 1400 people
and $50 million. [56] Introduction to the state of Georgia
with 79,000 employees and a $5 billion tudget represents, at
least in dollar terms, a hundred-fold increase. Even mere
significant is the introduction in the federal bureaucracy
with a budget of approximately *460 billion, almost an
additional hundred-fold increase. Not only is the magnitude
of the effort almost inconceivable but so also is the
process substantially more complex in the governmental
arena. In contrast to the relatively streamlined
organization of most commercial enterprises is the
tremendously complex and perhaps cumbersome bureaucracies of
state and federal government wherein programs overlap
organizations and vice versa. While little continues to be
known about the direct relationships cf programs to
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objectives, even less is known about the interdependencies
resulting in such a complex organization as state and
federal government.
A second difference between public and private
budgeting, and particularly zero-base budgeting, lies in the
ability to express both costs and benefits in guantitative
terms. Erivate industry has its profit motive and
accordingly the firm is able to analyze and prioritize its
activities on the basis of relative dollar ccsts and dollar
benefits resulting therefrom. That Xerox's Service Job
Enrichment program offers net annual benefits of $9,92C and
a ccst-benefit ratio of 1 to 24.3 [57] is meaningful in
terms of overall profit criteria. In the public arena, the
ccsts and benefits and criteria against which they are
measured are much less quantifiable. Since most public
projects are not marketed, for example defense and
education, price dees not exist as a measure of benefits.
Cther measures of benefit such as workload output and social
impact must instead be defined. While benefits can be
defined in non-financial terms, their ncn-commensurability
makes the ranking process a matter of value judgements that,
in a democracy, is left to the political process. In
contrast to ranking in private firms which is predicated on
finding the most efficient use of resources, prioritizing
activities in government is based on factcrs other than
efficiency, such as need, which might result in intentional
inefficiencies.
The entree of politics is perhaps a third difference
between public and private budgeting. Like the market's
role in determining the production and distribution of goods
in tne private sector, the political arena is the means by
which the production and distribution of public goods is
directed. The extent to which adequate information is made
available in the political process and the environmental
conditions motivating its use will determine the degree of
incrementalism or rationalism exhibited. Notwithstanding
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the foregoing, the entree cf politics substantially
increases the number of decision makers involved as ccupared
to the private sector.
The fourth and perhaps most significant aspect of putlic
versus private budgeting that impacts upon the zero-base
budgeting methodology is the different incentives motivating
public and private decision makers. In the private sector,
management is much more oriented to the profit critericn. a
manager's performance is rewarded for the degree of
efficiency and profit acheived. He knows that the greater
the profit the greater his chance of survival. Therefore
"The reallocation of resources in the name of
survival becomes a much more easilv achieved
objective. . . "[58 ]
than in the public arena where an individual's status , and
to some extent »'GS" rating, depends en the number of
employees and the size of the budget supervised.
Confronted by the above difficulties it is not
surprising that successful i iplementaticn of zero-base
budgeting in the public sector is perhaps even more
dependent than the private sector on these characteristics
listed in the previous section (i.e., testing, strong
leadership, innovation, planning and human considerations).
That this is so can be illustrated by a brief sketch cf two
state government applications.
1 Zero-base Budgeting in G eorg ia
Perhaps the classic case of zero-base budgeting in
state government is that of Georgia where it was first
adopted on March 15, 1971, for preparation cf the FY 1973
budget reguest. Following the conceptual model developed in
the preceding Chapter, Georgia's budget process is built
around three program levels - program (the lowest level)
,
activity (the middle level) and department (the highest
level) . Beginning at the program level, say for example
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Emergency Medical Health, Food Services or Executive
Administration, a separate decision package is prepared for
each of three levels of effort - a minimum objective level,
a current cnjective level and an improvement objective
level. The minimum level represents that level below which
the program is not wortnwhile to perform. The minimum level
is expected to be below the current funding level. The
current objective increment brings total package funding to
a level necessary to support the current level of service.
The improvement objective increment represents a greater
objective than that currently being provided. Detailed on
each decision package, (see Figures (5), (6) and (7), are
related line item detail, objects of expenditure and
quantitative performance measurements. Accompanying each
package (except the minimum) are more detailed schedules as
necessary for justifying rental charges, contractual
expenses, per diem, etc. Following its preparatinon, each
decision package is ranked by the activity level maracer,
for exaiple the Ccimunity Injury Control Activity.
Subsequently activity rankings are merged into a Department
ranking such as the Human Resources Department. Appropriate
funding cut-off lines are drawn and exhibits submitted to
the Legislature.
In contrast to the implementation strategies of the
private firms previously reviewed, Georgia did not first
test the application of zero-base budgeting before its
expansion. Instead all agencies began preparing the F1 1973
budget request in June 1971 and were required to submit
three months later the required rankings. George Minmier in
his monograph on the Georgia experience [59], found that
sixty-five percent of departmental budget analysts
considered the advanced planning inadeguate. During this
initial iaplementation period, decision packages were poorly
prepared and along with rankings, frequently had to ce
resubmitted. Furthermore the number of levels of effort,
program structure and performance indices have undergone
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numerous annual iterations before being appropriately
defined. All of the above, factors in much of the
resistance encountered, could have been substantially
alleviated by adequate pre-implementaticn tests.
Sudden and across the board implementation of
zero-base budgeting was to have its behavioral impact as
well. Only after adoption of the new methodology were
department heads advised of the reasons for its appearance.
Any manager kept in the dark about a new system with which
he is to operate will consider it second rate no matter how
beneficial it might in fact be. And so the lack of
participation and consultation was to further resistance
even more.
Such resistance was to be caused not only by the
manner in which the new system was implemented but also by
the management practices following implementation. While
decision package rankings were professed as a flexible tool
in meeting changing resource levels (by mcving the cut-off
line up cr dci»n), it was not so used. New decision package
rankings were often requested and old cnes ignored as
changes in departmental funding levels occurred. The fact
that the Office of Planning and Budget did not use the
rankings as advertised was a fact not lest upon lower and
middle level managers.
A further problem with the Georgia zero-base tudget
methodology has been its non-acceptance by the state
Legislature. Without such acceptance, department managers
know they have a "second chance" in obtaining funds frcm the
Legislature. As Minmier indicated
"One departmental analyst stated that his
department was net tco interested in the
executive budaet because it was the State
Legislature that gave his department the
money it needed to carry out its programs.
"
Kithout the ccimitment cf both the Executive and Legislative
Eranches the viability of zerc-base budget becomes highly

suspect.
Perhaps the most significant lessen tc re learned from
the experience in Georgia is the need for a planning phase
as a prerequisite of the budget stage. Prior to 1971 the
planning stage of the resource allocation process was
cenducted by the Bureau cf State Planning and Community
Affairs while budget preparation was accomplished by the
Eudget Bureau. Both operated separately and concurrently
with little cooperation. Not surprisingly there were no-
budget guidelines available en which to base budget
preparation, plans were never implemented and incr ementalism
flourished. Implemented in 1971, zero-base budgeting, at
least initially, continued the separate and concurrent
planning and budgeting philosophy with the result that irany
decision packages and rankings did not reflect the goals and
objectives cf the state. Beginning with budget preparation
for FY 1974 the resource allocation process was reorganized
into a planning phase followed by a budgeting phase. Tc
this end, Governor Carter held a series cf meetings with
department heads and budget analysts to develop, establish
and affirm goals, objectives and Budgetary guidelines for
each department. Subsequent to such meetings, departments
were then tc formulate their decision packages.
Hampered by less than an optimal implementation
strategy, with an inoperative planning process and
uncooperative Legislature, it is somewhat surprising that
zero-base budgeting survived. That it did survive is
perhaps best evidence cf Governor Carter's unquestionable
support, active involvement and strong leadership. That it
has continued tc survive subsequent to his departure is
attributable to the high number of departmental analysts
(seventy-eight percent of the respondents to Minnier's
survey) who recommended its future use. [60]
2 2er c-base Budgeting in Texas
Zerc-base budgeting in Texas was first used in
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preparation cf the FY 1976-1977 biennial tudget and, with
slight modifications, was again used in the FY 1977-1978
biennial budget. It is an application that is perhaps
unique for several reasons including first the considerable
design effort associated with its implementation and
secondly its dual nature involving both the executive and
legislative branches in design, implementation and
operation
.
like most of its Georgian predecessors,
implementaticn in Texas was accomplished in less than the
optimal manner. Characterized by the use cf consultants,
substantial changes to the existing budget system and an
across the beard vice phased approach, implementation >as to
face immense difficulties. Perhaps most significant of
these difficulties was defining the type of information
needed tc support the decision making process. Parallelling
the dual executive and legislative involvement was a diverse
reguirement for information collection. On one hand members
of the Legislature might be concerned with the level of
program expenditures in a certain geographical area whereas
the Governor might be mere interested in the impact of
expenditures on a specific clientele. Similarly the
reguirements of the Governor and Legislators are more
oriented toward wide program and functional areas and
associated measures cf effectiveness whereas activity and
program managers have a more narrow perspective and shculd
be mere preoccupied with measures of efficiency. During the
design of the zero-base budgeting process, the needs and/or
desires cf top level (the Governor's and Legislator's)
management were never communicated to agency personnel and
tudget examiners. In consequence, these staff personnel
were placed in the frustrating position of either attempting
tc anticipate the needs cf top management or designing a
system which, although meeting their own reguirements, did
little for the upper echelons. This was a major problem




The development of a program structure in Texas was
both a necessary prerequisite tc zero-base tudgeting end an
attempt tc cope with informational requirements. Zero-base
tudgeting in Texas actually served to formalize previous
efforts at building a programmatic classification of
information. The development of a program structure was a
joint effort by program structure teams consisting of
examiners from both legislative and executive budget staff
offices, a program evaluation unit, consultant and agency
personnel. Subject to oversight Dy a program structure
review comnittee (including senior examiners and
consultants) , the program structure teams operated urder a
set of guidelines in developing agency programs and
activities. Two approaches were used in the design effort
including
-a top-down approach focusing en agency
objectives and the grouping cf agency
activities into programs according to these
objectives and






Accomplished separately these two approaches were
subsequently integrated into an acceptable program structure
with all cf the characteristics - needs, objectives,
workload and performance measures. The resulting program
structures were well received not only by both budget
examiners and agency personnel buz by the Governor and
Legislators as well. So well accepted were the agency
structures that the 1 S 76 - 1S77 appropriations format was of
a program orientation. The previous line-item, object of




The program structure developed consists of four levels
- from lowest to highest, the activity (e.g., Outpatient
Services), program (e.g., Bureau of Tuberculosis Services),
program area (e. g. , Preventable Diseases) and function
(e.g.. Health and Welfare) . Within this framework the Texas
zero-base budgeting process places consideratle emphasis on
an initial planning phase in which both agency and program
managers seek to identify program needs and objectives. As
part of this phase is the development of a Program Decision
Package - Need Table that specifies the target population to
which the reed relates, a target population which will be
affected immediately, an indicator of the severity of the
need, an indicator of the urgency and an indicator cf the
demand for which services are not provided.
Cnce such planning and program guidelines have been
established, activity managers formulate Activity Decision
Packages accordingly, complete with all the features of
zero-base budgeting and accompanied by special object of
expenditure, method cf financing and personal services
exhibits. Program managers then rank the Activity Decision
Packages on Activity Priority Tables. Subsequently, and
based on the Activity Priority Tables, program managers
develop Program Decision Packages. One cf the primary
differences between the Activity and Prcgram Decision
Packages is their respective efficiency and effectiveness
orientations . Program Decision Packages are subsequently
ranked by agency administrators to she* the relative
emphasis that is is recommended for each prcgram level.
3. Summary of State A£plications
The Georgia and Texas applications of zero-base
budgeting are only two of an increasing number cf state
applications. A review of enly these two however
demonstrates that the characteristics of success are not
totally different from those in the commercial sector. Top
management's commitment and leadership, imaginative
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adaptation of the concepts tc needs and styles, cultivation
of the human aspects and preliminary planning bcth in
systems implementation and program requirements remain the
essential ingredients of success. The additional
experiences cf other states such as New Jersey, Rhode Island
and New Mexico, just tc name a few, lend further suppcrt to
the importance of these characteristics.
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VI. ZERO-BASE BUDGETING IN THE FEDERAL SECTOE
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous five chapters the authcr has dealt in
depth with the budget reform movement, particularly that of
the executive budget, in the United States. By examining
each of its phases, the causes, characteristics and
outcomes, the authcr has hoped tc provide mere than a lesson
in history. Indeed it has teen the author's purpose tc
portray budget reform as the product of an ideal, that is
the rational budget, and the environment in which pursued.
Ey so dcing, the stage has been set fcr zero-base budgeting
in the federal sector.
In what follows, the author will first provide a brief
exploration cf the environment in which federal zerc-base
budgeting is to be pursued. Following this will be an
assessment of the process as currently being pursued by the
Carter Administration. Moving from a macrc tc a micro pcint
of view, the author will examine the FY 1979 approach to
zero-base budgeting in one federal agency, the U. S. Navy.
In conclusion the author will present an alterrative




The considerable effort associated with implementing
zero-base budgeting in private industry and state government
was described by the case examples cited in the preceding
chapter. That an increasing number of private corporations
and public todies are adopting the new aethodolocy is
evidence by itself of the benefits attainable. Discovery of
those reasons underlying the relatively sudden emergence of
a new reform era, however, reguires further exploration.
From its very first implementation in Texas Instrunents,
Inc., zero-base budgeting has gained rapid acceptance
because its technigues were consistent with the needs cf the
times. raced by the recent recession, most companies sought
a means cf appraising and controlling overhead costs. The
intrinsic features of zero-base budgeting whereby all costs,
current as well as proposed, were revealed was found tc be
an ideal means for such an appraisal and control. This fact
was not lest upon the federal sector wherein reform is again
advocated by many.
As in the case of PEE and performance budgeting,
zero-base budgeting draws its impetus from groups with
diverse motives. On the one hand is the taxpayer who
perceives government (particularly at the national level) as
not only tec big, ineffective and wasteful but as growing
bigger and more ineffective. The resulting taxpayer
resistance tc any noticn of higher taxes places a severe
constraint en those who would propose new programs - the
politician. As indicated in the following table[61], the
growth in government spending has been paralleled by an







Permanent Approp 55o 165b
Uncontrollable 59% 77%
Paced by the rapid growth of uncontrollable spending aid the
commensurate shrinkage of discretionery funds, it has become
apparent to bureaucrat and politician alike that new
mechanisms cf choice and management are necessary. That
such a change is occurring is attested to hy the comments of
Senator Abraham Ribicoff (Democrat, Conneticut) who, having
watched Ccngress cater to each program's r.arrow
constituencies for thirteen years, now states -
"sure there are small constituencies behind
each program, but there's a bigger
constituency out there that's tired of
toe-big government, and these small
constituencies can't stand up against
that. "[62]
A further indicator cf change was the passage cf the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment and Control Set of
1974. While having as its primary impetus the excesses of
the Nixcn Administration, uncontrollable and backdoor
spending were to be no small factors. Furthermore,
following ir the wake cf the macro perspectives of the 1974
Budget Act, came a proliferation of micro budget review
techniques, the mest important being Senator Muskie's
Government Economy and Spending fieform Act of 1976
(proposed) which included both Sunset and zero-base
budgeting previsions. Sponsored by over 50% cf the Senate,
and with similar support in the House, Muskie's proposal was





On the ether hand, and not unrelated tc the taxpayer's
concern, certain politicians have lent to zerc-tase
budgeting a more positivist role. Take for example
President Carter who finds in zero-base budgeting a means of
reducing the uncontrollable portion of the budget and
inefficiencies so as to provide more discretionery funding
to be used in new, much needed programs. Witness Cartels
comment that
"...there is no inherent conflict between
careful planning. tight budgeting and
constant management reassessment en tne cne
hand, and compassionate concern for the
deprived and afflicted on the ether. Waste
ana inefficiency never fed a hungry child,
provided a job for a willing worker, or
educated a deserving student ."[ 6 3
j
Indeed it is President Carter's stated objective to increase
public services by reducing such waste and inefficiency
through the rudget review prccess.
Regardless of whether the end objective is to return
funds to the taxpayer's pocket or reallocate them tc sccial
welfare programs, zero-base budgeting fits ricely into the
political, sccial and economic trends of the 1970s. Even
more than a method of attaining such objectives however,
zero-base budgeting offers both legislator and bureaucrat a
means of coping with the massive detail of infcrnation
implicit in review of the federal oudget. Indicative of
Congressional concern in this regard are the commer.ts of
Senator Boilings (Democrat, South Carolina) -
"Everyone in this body is familiar with the
difficulty of trying to evaluate and decide
upen hundreds and hundreds of budget line
items and programs, and fit then into a
coherent and adequate picture of where we
are. ..and where we should be head ing. . . "[ 64 ]
and Senator Erooks (Republican, Massachusetts) -
122

"...Congress also needs to have available
appropriation requests on a simplified basis.
Appropriations reported on a program basis
would be far more meaningful to us than those
reported on an object classification basis,
such as we follow today. Appropriations
requests relating to expenditures for
personnel, travel, supplies, equipment., etc.,
of an entire department are meaningless sc
far as determining program priorities is
concerned. Appropriations priorities must be
based upon activity needs and benefits. "[ 65 ]
Through its decision packages and rankings, zero-base
budgeting provides a perspective from which the budget can
be viewed as a whole with program and activity needs and
benefits clearly defined. Whereas the program orientation
of PPE was somewhat premature and viewed with suspicion by
Congress, the package structure of zero-base budgetiEg may
be just "what the doctor ordered." That such a new approach
was accepted as more than the musings of budget critics, is
reflected in the following comments contained in Government
Executive -
"Even on Capitol Hill, past critics of line
item programs, usually on the basis of cost
overruns, will find themselves increasingly
out of tune with their colleagues. In short,
a greater number of Congressmen than in more
than a decade will be paying greater
attention to threat estimates than to pet
hardware pro jects . "[ 66 ]
Thus from noth the wider perspective of economic, political
and social trends and the mechanics cf budget review,
zero-base budgeting appears to have found fertile ground for
growth.
Perhaps most significant to the survival of zero-base
budgeting, is the fact that its support has come frcm not
only the Chief Executive but frcm politicians and
legislators, a circumstance net so evident in previous
executive reforms. With President Carter having placed
himself at the helm of a reform movement parallelling
Congressional interests, one sees a fortuitous linkage of
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the zero-case budgeting process and the environment in which
it is being pursued.
C. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR
Although not discounting the contribution of
environment, the lessons of past reform efforts also place a
substantial premium en implementation strategy. Frocc tcth
these lessons and these of of current zerc-base budgeting
applications, certain basic ingredients for successful
implementation have been defined and include
-tcp mazagement commitment and leadership.
-adequate consideration of human factors in
system implementation.
-adequate planning in both systems design and
development cf program objectives.
-imaginative adaptation of the system tc
management needs and styles.
Using these ingredients as a guide, an assessment of the
current efforts to implement zero-base budgeting in the
federal sector can be made. Rather than reiterating a
description of the federal approach, wnich can be found in
CME Bulletin 77-9 and is not surprisingly like the concept
defined in Chapter IV, such an assessment is made in the
following paragraphs.
1 . Tc£ M ana_gemen t Lea dership and Commitment
In his 1S76 presidential campaign, President Carter vowed
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to achieve a complete overhaul and reorganization cf the
federal tureaucracy and its budget system. Following his
election, any doubts as to his commitment were dispelled by
his immediate application of the concept to the White House
and subseguent memorandum, dated 14 February 1977, tc all
departments and agencies advising each
"...to develop a zero base system within your
agency in accordance with instructions to be
issued by tne Office of Management and
Budget. "[67]
Appointed tc head the Office of Management and Budget, two
individuals, Mr. Bert Lance and Mr. James Mclntyre, whc had
both been deeply involved in the Georgia prccess,
immediately began to prepare these instructions. To meet
the immediate problem of promulgating budget guidance,
design cf the system and development of instructions was not
accomplished in a vacuun by a special staff but instead
assigned to the permanent Eudget Review and Examination
Eivisicns. Ey so doing President Carter, Lance and Mclntyre
have demcnstrated that zero-bas€ budgeting is to be "the
decision making process." Such commitment has further been
emphasized by an unprecedented Spring Budget Review in which
agency and department heads participated with President
Carter directly in the definition of those issues tc be
highlighted by the Fall zero-base reviews. As if this were
net sufficient to demonstrate his commitment, President
Carter has furthermore established as grcund rules fcr the
fall budget appeals the primary role tc be played by
departmental and agency rankings.
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To date the conmitment cf top management to zerc-tase
budgeting has been quite evident. While zerc-base budgeting
will not in its first year, in all probability, have
permeated too deeply into the federal bureaucracy, the
demonstration of top management support will certainly
facilitate further expansion in the future. At least it is
clear that the Carter Administration has put to work many of
the lessens derived from past reform efforts.
2 • Adequate Consideration of Human Factors
Having followed on the heels of the failings and
controversy of PPB, zero-base budgeting has most assuredly
encountered considerable resistance. Perhaps in
anticipation of such resistance, President Carter, Director
Lance and Deputy Mclntyre have attempted tc incorporate into
the systems design, to the greatest extent possible, the
participation of all those involved. for instance, both
Carter and Lance have met repeatedly with Cabinet officials
tc explain the process and emphasize Presidential
commitment. The fiscal officers of federal agencies have
been given the opportunity to comment on draft CM3
instructions. . Liaison between OMB budget examiners and
agency budget personnel has been firmly established. Cn May
23, 1977, these agency personnel, numbering several hur.dred,
were to meet with President Carter and to be assured cf his
commitment.
Perhaps most indicative of the joint participation
has been the extensive involvement of ail parties, CME (at
both examiner and division level) and agency, in
accomodating agency needs and achieving joint agreement on
specific aspects of the zero-base budgeting process. Such
agreements have included, but have not been limited to, the
specific issues cf decision package preparation,
consolidation, ranking and justification as viell as a host
cf more technical budgeting issues. furthermore such
involvement has not been limited to 0MB and agency staffs
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but has extended to the Congressional Appropriations
Committees, Eudget Committees, the General Accounting Cffice
and Congressional Budget Cffice. The existence of such
close working relationships and dialogue between all
involved is substantial evidence that zero-rase budgeting is
net following the same path as PPB. Whether such
relationships can be perpetuated to lower levels cf the
bureaucracy remains to be seen. Clearly though, zerc-base
budgeting has had a gocd beginning.
3. Adequate Planning in Systems Sesio.n and Prc^raa
Sijectives
With respect to systems design, zerc-base budgeting
in the federal sector has not had the luxury of
pre-implementation tests characteristic of private sector
applications. Instead, following the example of Georgia and
necessitated by the perceived political time constraints of
the four year presidential term, zero-base budgeting has
been applied across all agencies subject to executive budget
review. Eaving had little time for adequate preparation, it
is probable that success in its first year of
inplementaticn, FY 1979, will be somewhat limited. Perhaps
just as in Georgia, considerable time will pass before all
cf its problems have been fully identified and solutions
found. Whether zerc-base budgeting can survive the problems
and associated frustrations arising from untested, across
the board inplementaticn will depend a great deal upon the
persistence of the considerable top management conmitment
already witnessed.
Net unrelated to the above is the planning of
activity objectives. Despite the legacy of analytical
resources remaining after PPB, program planning and its
linkage to budgeting remains a critical weakness in federal
budgeting. lor all the reasons cited in Section C of
Chapter III and Section C of Chapter V, the development of
objectives upon which to base budgeting has never been fully
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accomplished except in a few instances such as Defense. For
this reason alone, it would be wise not to expect too mucn
from zero-base budgeting in the immediate future. While
statement of specific objectives and guantifiable measures
cf performance may fce lacking in the initial years,
zero-base budgeting should soon force improvements ir this
regard. As indicated in Chapter IV, zero-base budgeting
will serve not only to call attention to the lack of
planning tut will also through its decision units and
packages facilitate definitcn of the input-cutput
relationships that enable such planning. Until such tiie as
this can be accomplished and institutionalized, strong top
management leadership and persistence will remain at a
premium.
4 . Adaptation of Zer o-bas e Budgeting to Management
Nj^cs and Styles
OMB's implementation strategy, including all of the
above, can test be characterized as a decentralized one. In
this regard CMB has taken the position that while the
conceptual framework and genera] rules can be specified, the
diversity cf federal organizations, each with its
idiosyncracies, renders the promulgation of a single
detailed approach unwise. Instead each agency has been
allowed to address its own requirements and to develcp its
own applicaticn of zerc-base budgeting. Unlike PP3 however,
agencies have not been left entirely en their own but
instead have oeen guided by the President's Spring Eudget
Eeview decisions and by the nor. unsuustantial agency-CMB
liaison cencerning decision packages, consolidations and
rankings. Since the rigidity of PPB as applied in civilian
agencies was cne of the principle factors in its demise, the
flexibility is particularly evident in the way zerc-fcase
budgeting is being approached in the Department of Defense.
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E. THE EEPAETMENT OF DEFENSE APPROACH TO ZEEO-BASS
EUDGETING
Shortly after its release, the President's 14 February
1977 memorandum was relayed by the Secretary cf Defense to
each of the Services. In so dcing each Service was advised
to prepare plans for implementing zero-base budgeting as
part of the FY 1979 budget process. Accordingly, each
service developed a unique approach, consistent with its own
decision making requirements. One such approach, that of
the U.S. Navy, is described in seme detail in the fcllcwing
paragraphs. An alternative approach is then offered for
inplementat icn in the 1980s.
1 • C urr ent U^S^ Navy Approach
The Navy's approach to zero-base budgeting is not
substantially different from the way prior year budgets have
been developed except in terminology (e.g., decision units,
decision packages, etc.) used. OME officials have teen
thoroughly briefed on Defense PPES and have agreed that it,
tc a very large extent, accomplishes what zerc-base
budgeting proposes. In this regard, much of the Navy's
budget has been subjected to a zero-base evaluation curing
the programming phase. Certainly the major procurement
accounts (Weapons Procurement Navy, Aircraft Procurement
Navy and Snip Construction Navy) and Research, Development,
lest and Evaluation account are zero-based during the
programming phase. These alcne comprise approximately 44X
of the Fy 1978 Presidential Budget. Adding to this the
personnel appropriations whose requirements arise out of
force level decisions and the Military Construction
appropriation request which is justified frci zero up each
year, the percentage increases to ar>cut 632. Additionally
certain portions of the operating accounts have been
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zero-based, for example, flying and steaming hours and depot
maintenance (ships and aircraft) . Because the programming
phase of PPES accomplishes nuch of what zerc-base budgeting
sets out to do, the Navy's approach has been to use EFE as a
framework to which certain of zero-base budgeting's Here
useful attributes are added.
In view of the above, the Navy's approach to FY 1979
tudget development is to use the FY 1979 Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM 79) as a starting point (assuming that most
of what is included has been subject tc a zerc-base review).
Throughout the programming process, adjustments tc the
Department of the Navy Five Year Program (DCNEYP) are made
by program element, adjustments which can be tracked by
budget activity, appropriation and major claimant. The EOM
recpresents the 5ECNAV recommended program and is supported
by recommended changes to the Defense FYDP. As such, major
claimant and rudget activity control totals are derived from
the POM and provide the constraints for claimant budget
development. The Secretary of Defense then promulgates a
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) which eitner approves the
Navy POM or makes adjustments thereto, thus requiring
subsequent adjustment of claimant constraints. Becaus€ the
FEM is issued after the claimants have commenced budget
development, the PCM claimant and budget activity totals are
the foundation of the Navy's FY 1979 zero-base budget.
With respect tc the major claimants, the Navy has
generally defined the decision unit to be each appropriation
or fund. (Fcr submission to the Secretary of Defense,
however, major claimant inputs are consolidated by Navy
headquarter ' s analysts into decision units closely
resembling the Program Budget Decision (PEE) structure of
previous years.) Additionally each claimant's budget
submission is to include a prioritized listing of increments
and decrements to meet varying levels of funding fcr each
appropriation. These proposed increments and decrements are
considered the equivalent of claimant decision packages.
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With respect to the varying levels of funding for each
appropriation, three alternative levels have teen specified
for FY 1979 budget development by the claimants. The 3asic
Level, is as in previous years and will reflect the EOM
claimant totals as adjusted for pricing changes (pay raises,
etc.). The Minimum Level is defined as the FY 1978
President's Budget as augmented for pay raises. A
prioritized listing frcm the Basic Level tc the Minimum
Level is to be reflected in each claimant's submission. The
Addendum Level will include those programs which could not
be acccmcdated within the Basic Level and is attained by
adding a prioritized listing of increments (net to exceed 3%
of the Basic Level) to the Basic Level. The range of tudget
alternatives provided by the above for FY 197S is
approximated by the following:
Total
Mil O/MN
Addendum $47.23 $12. 3B
tCM 43.6 11.9
Minimum 39.7 10.9
For the FY 1979 budget development exercise, major
claimants are assigned the initial responsibility for
ranking/prioritizing increments from the Basic Level to tne
Minimum Level. No prioritization of programs within the
Minimum Level will be accomplished. Upcn receipt cf the
claimant submissions bcth the Minimum Level budget and first
and secend incremental listings thereto will be "scrubbed"
by Navy budget analysts to ensure correct pricing and
validity. At this pcint the inpact of the Navy*s approach
tc zero-base budgeting is most racognizatle. Both the
submission cf increments and decrements bj each claimant;
the necessity to coordinate program and organizational
interdependencies ; and the building and ranking of balanced
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alternatives represent a substantial change to the normal
way of doing business. Since these increments and
decrements represent proposed changes to the S2CNAV ECM,
program analysts as well as numerous sponsors must be
brought mere explicitly into the budget review process.
What will result may very well be a new decision structure,
incorporating mere of a program emphasis, superimposed on
the budget phase of PPE.
Perhaps the most difficult problem generated by the
Navy's approach to zero-base budgeting is that of defining
and ranking decision packages. Unlike Texas Instruments
Inc. and various state governments, discrete decision units
are difficult to define in DCC except at such macro levels
that their utility is doubtful. Interdependencies of
programs, functions, activities, etc., appear the rule vice
the exception. How one sorts out these dependencies is a
crucial unanswered guestion. If, for example, an increment
for additional F-18s is identified by one claimant in tne
Aircraft Procurement Appropriation, increments should also
be included by other claimants for aircraft maintenance and
training in the Operation and Maintenance Appropriation and
for direct military pay in the Military Personnel
Appropriations. Inclusion of one decision package increment
without all ether interdependent packages would result in an
imbalanced tudget. With numerous claimants involved, the
coordination problems become substantial if not
overwhelming. What is attempted is the construction, ret of
a listing cf discrete decision packages as in the case of
Texas Instruments, but instead a list cf alternative
balanced tudgets, each consisting of numerous
cross-organi2ational and cross-program units.
2. Il2£^sed Alternative for the 1980s
The Navy's approach to zero-base budgeting in FY
1979 is somewhat difficult to fit into the conceptual model
defined in Chapter IV. From a budget perspective, the
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approach taken appears not so much as zerc-tase budgeting,
tut instead as a continuation of PPBS with a form of
incremental analysis completing the process. Certainly the
time constrained atmosphere within which zerc-base budgeting
iiplementaticn has been required is a primary factor leading
tc this approach. Perhaps from a wider perspective it can
be argued that, since a large portion of the Navy's prcgrams
are subjected to a zero-base evaluation, the current
approach is not inconsistent with Chapter IV's model.
However, since CM3 has decided not tc force substantial
changes en Defense PPBS, it does not appear appropriate to
proceed through the detailed analysis of alternatives in the
programming phase and then develop a zero-base budget which
subjects the approved programs to an unsystematic
reformatting into decision units, packages and alternative
levels.
In the following paragraphs, the author outlines a
recommended approach tc zerc-base budgeting in the 1980s.
In so doing, FY 1979 is treated as a transition period and
not used as a basis for further development. Instead the
author strays not tec far from the existing Defense EPBS
process, placing emphasis on that informaticr and analysis
which flews through the process vice changes to the process
itself.
a. Elanning
first of all, the existing planning phase of
PPES need net te changed but shculd instead be strengthened
by greater White House, National Security Council and
Congressional policy guidance. If budget development and
subsequent budget review is to serve a purpose, that is, the
attainment of national security, each must be based upon
objective threat assessment, agreed upon strategies and
policies and the assignment of specific responsibilities for
strategy execution. Until the threats, strategies and
policies have been identified, the alternative means (that
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is f decision units) and alternative levels cf performance
(decision packages) for strategy execution cannct be
defined. Although PPBS has accomplished much toward this
end since 1S61, considerably mere remains tc be done in the
way of linking JSOP assessments and secretarial guidance.
Notwithstanding the need for such improvements, zero-base
budgeting can be effectively used within the existing
planning framework net only to define the optimum mix of
activities in pursuit cf a given strategy, tut as indicated




& product cf the planning process should b€ the
ident if icaticn cf basic missions for which the Department of
Defense is tc be held responsible. An example within the
Navy might be Sea Control with subordinate missions of
Anti-Air warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Anti-Surface
Warfare. Within each mission classification there are
various reguired capabilities necessary to meet the
potential threat(s) . Within Anti-Air Warfare for example
there is the need to destroy anti-ship missiles and
aircraft. The means to accomodate such needs are found in
the various groupings cf program elements, i.e., integrated
combinations of men, eguipment and facilities which tccether
constitute an identifiable military capability.
Since it is the smallest aggregation of men,
eguipment and facilities whose output contributes directly
tc mission needs and to which activities can be related
without regard to appropriation or claimant, the program
element is ideally suited for and is recommended as the
decision unit. Program elements are an inherent part cf the
existing resource allocation decision process, are an
integral part of the existing computerized Five Year Program
structure and are under the control of specifically assigned
program element sponsors. They are therefore tailor made as
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the decision units of zero-base budgeting.
c. Decision Packages
Given the massive coordination problems inherent
in the Navy's current approach to zero-base budgeting, an
alternative to the use of Minimum, Basic and Enhanced dollar
threshhclds is needed. An appropriate alternative
methodology is to assign the definition of performance
levels to the program-planning stage vice the budgeting
stage. Eased upon planning guidance (threat assessment,
strategy, etc.), program issues from the Secretary of
Defense and cn-going force analysis, alternative performance
levels, specific and programmatic in nature, should be
identified for each mission and contributing program element
or aggregations thereof. For example, a Minimum Level of
steaming hours, flying hours or sortie rates might be
established, below which a particular program element ceases
to be cost effective in counteracting a given threat. The
Current Level might reflect either the existing performance
level or that which can be supported by anticipated funding.
An Enhanced level would represent a performance capatility
in excess cf current mission need; for example, a switch
from defensive to offensive capability. Within the program
element, each alternative performance level would constitute
a decision package for which the standard zerc-case
budgeting analysis must be accomplished.
The necessary analysis of each decision
unit/program element and decision package (alternative
performance level) can be completed in one of two ways.
Given adequate cost estimating technigues, the costs and
effectiveness of each performance level can te determined by
headguarters program, mission, appropriation sponsors and
tudget analysts. Having completed such analysis, decision
packages would be ready for ranking. If such cost
estimating technology is not available at the headguarters
level, the programmatic guidance for each alternative
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performance level would be promulgated tc the applicable
major claimants. Major claimants would then build the
appropriate decision packages and submit them after ranking
to Navy headquarters for review and consolidation. The
latter method would appear most desirable in that it
introduces bottcm-up participation within tot-down
structured guidance. In either case those decision units
having fcrce level implications would be analyzed first,
followed by those involving operations and lastly, those
involving support.
d. Cecisicn Package Ranking
fcaving completed the structured decision package
analysis, each would be ranked within mission area according
tc its relative contributions in satisfying mission needs.
Top Navy management would then have available to it the raw
materials with which to formulate a Program Objectives
Memorandum at three levels - a minimum, current and enhanced
level. Included therein would be rankings of Minimum,
current and enhanced capabilities that would provide a means
of allocating resources optimally within any given funding
level with full knowledge of the risks at that particular
level.
e. Eudgeting
Having defined in the POM the alternative
performance levels and associated funding requirements,
preparation of annual budget exhibits by subordinate
commands could proceed in a structured and guided manner.
Knowing the levels of performance to be achieved and their
relative priorities, claimants could then build decision
packages and supporting schedules, in such a way (perhaps
functionally) as to achieve end objectives nest efficiently.
Eudgeting wculd then become not just a drill in balancing
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the books, tut instead an organized and systematic process
ty which decision unit/program element line managers may
pursue end objectives.
f. Summary
The foregoing proposed approach to zerc-tase
budgeting is not without its difficulties. First of all it
assumes the aviiability of adeguate measures of
effectiveness which in many areas, particularly in support
programs, have not been developed. A second problem is the
multi-purpose nature ot certain forces and the difficulty of
portraying them within any one mission area. A third
problem is the time constraints within which any system must
function. With adeguate analysis and systems design effort
these problems as well as the many others can be overcome.
While such difficulties are hopefully temporary in nature,
the benefits to be derived from the above approach would be
fairly long lasting. Perhaps the most significant of these
is that decision unit/packag € development and ranking is the
product of considerable systematic analysis, which having
been accomplished in the existing decision making process,





The preceding five chapters have scught to place
zero-base budgeting in the broad context of an evclving
executive budget reform movement. The authci's purpose in
dcing so has been two fold - first, to isolate those factors
in previous reform efforts as well as current zerc-base
budgeting applications that have either facilitated or
hindered the pursuit of rational resource allocation and,
secondly, to assess the current federal zerc-base budgeting
effort, its progress, problems and prospects.
With respect to the former, environment and
inplementaticn strategy have emerged as the prime
determinants of nearly every past reform success or failure.
Political, social and economic trends have been the catalyst
for (as well as inhibitor cf) change, with top management
support, adaptability, human factor considerations and
adequate plaining as the essential ingredients. Recognition
of the foregcing can surely enhance the prcbabilities of
success in future iiplementations of zerc-base budgeting.
Indeed it is the author's conclusion that initial efforts
toward zero-case budgeting in the federal arena are being
pursued net only within a conducive environment but with all
the essential ingredients.
The extent to which zero-base budgeting can be
iiplemented as conceptualized in Chapter 17 is a matter of
conjecture for which history must be the judge. Whether the
persistence of the Carter Administration can successfully
compete with the ancient, but surprisingly endurable
prophecy cf Ecclesiastes 1:9 -
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"The thing that hath been, it is that which
shall be: and that which is dene is that
which shall he done; and there is no new
thing under the sun."
-remains to te seen. Just as the more useful aspects of
previous reforms have survived, it is nearly certain that
the more useful aspects of zero-base budgeting will survive.
In so doing, another step toward the raticnal budget will
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